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As  part  of its research program on traditiolial  fish- 
eries,  the  International Center  for Living Aquatic Re- 
sources  Management  (ICLARM),  in  cooperation  with 
other  fisheries  organizations,  is  preparing  a  series  of 
publications  that review  research conducted to date on 
the  problems of traditional fisheries and fishermen and 
alternative development policies and programs that seek 
to alleviate them. These reviews seek to summarize and 
generalize  from  previous  research  results and  develop- 
ment experience in the belief that valuable insights can 
be  gained  by  taking  stock  of what is already known. 
Moreover, the reviews seek to address the broad issues of 
development and management policies regarding the tra- 
ditional fisheries sector and to encourage a research and 
development climate in which meaningful discussion and 
analysis of alternative policies are possible. 
This monograph, A Research  Framework for Tradi- 
tional Fisheries, which concentrates on Southeast Asia is 
the  first  prepared  in  this  connection.  It  was  written 
during my  first year as an  ICLARM  staff member and 
serves as  a backdrop  against which country-specific re- 
search  reviews  are  being  undertaken.  Country-specific 
papers, although of course varying in  scope and under- 
lying  theme,  cover  resource,  technological,  socioeco- 
nomic, and institutional aspects of  traditional  fisheries 
production  and  distribution,  and  are joint  projects of 
ICLARM  and  institutions  in  the  country concerned. 
A primary  purpose of this monograph is to identify 
those  areas of traditional  fisheries research  which have 
the greatest potential for contributing to the solution of 
problems  facing  traditional  fishermen and  their  com- 
munities.  To  achieve  this  purpose,  this  monograph 
draws on both theoretical  and empirical considerations 
available in the widely scattered literature of traditional 
fisheries.  The  conclusions of this monograph establish 
priority  areas  that  will  guide the  traditional  fisheries 
research  program  of  ICLARM,  details  of  which  can 
be found in ICLARM's  program statements. 
IAN  R. SMITH 
ICLARM, Manila 
September 25,1979 Contents 
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There  is an  explicit  link  between development pro- 
grams and supportive research endeavors. If the goal of 
development programs is to raise the standard of living of 
traditional fishing communities, the goal of research should 
be to expand and clarify the alternative choices available 
to decision makers, be they government policy makers or 
project  managers,  private  entrepreneurs,  or  fishermen 
themselves. 
A primary purpose of this monograph is to identify 
those areas of traditional fisheries research which have the 
greatest potential for contributing to the solution of prob- 
lems facing traditional fishermen and their communities. 
To achieve this purpose, the monograph draws on both 
theoretical  and  empirical considerations available in the 
widely scattered literature of traditional fisheries. Follow- 
ing an overview which examines the goals and potentially 
conflicting objectives of development planning, a catego- 
rization of problems of traditional f~eries  as either em- 
pirical or suppositional is proposed. The former involves 
the concrete difficulties facing fuhermen such as limited 
'openrccess'  resources, inadequate vessels and gear, lack 
of market power, lack of alternative income sources, and 
inflation. The latter, on the other hand, involvestheassump- 
tions  that  decision makers bring to bear on matters of 
development policy, planning, and research. It is argued 
national Center for Living Aquatic Resources Manage- 
ment. Manila. 45 p. 
that fishermen and fishing community oriented perspec- 
tives  are  essential to  understanding  the problems and 
prospects of development in this sector. 
After tracing the changing emphasis of past develop- 
ment  programs,  the paper discusses alternative develop- 
ment  strategies, analyzes  the  relevant  theoretical  pre- 
dictions and research issues associated with each, and con- 
cludes that long-term solutions to problems of low stand- 
ards of living lie in reducing rather than in increasing fish- 
ing effort. 
The futility of relying on approaches that directly or 
indirectly intensify the level of fishing effort (except in 
those decreasing number of cases where the resource re- 
mains underexploited) implies that priority  for develop- 
ment and research should be given to those programs that 
reduce  fishing intensity.  The  following four general re- 
search areas are therefore suggested: 
1. Assessment of stocks exploited by traditional and 
industrial fishermen and estimation of maximum sustain- 
able yields; 
2.  Development  of management  tools and programs 
appropriate for limiting fishing effort in the multispecies 
fisheries exploited by traditional and industrial fishermen; 
3.  Reduction of waste in the diibution system and 
exploration  of  ways in  which  resulting benefits can be channeled to traditional fishermen; and, most importantly,  hand,  of  the  resource/fisherman/distribution  continuum 
4. Development of  alternative or  supplementary in-  and, on the  other hand, of the linkages among fisheries, 
come sources for  traditional fishermen and  their house-  fishing communities, and  other rural sectors and institu- 
holds.  tions, including government. The former is a vertical con- 
Complementing  these  priority  areas, indeed to some  cept  and  the latter  an  horizontal concept, which taken 
extent  a  necessary  precondition of their  application, is  together imply the necessity for an holistic perspective of 
the requirement to develop an understanding, on the one  fisheries and fishing communities. 
Introduction 
The  general  conditions  of  poverty  characteristic of 
traditional  fishing communities around  the world  have 
increasingly  drawn  the  attention  of  governments and 
other change agents in recent years, and have led to the 
initiation  of  development  programs of varied hue and 
form. These programs, although expressing a variety of 
specific objectives, have as their urgent goal, implicitly if 
not  explicitly,  the  raising of the  standard  of living of 
these communities. This objective is a recent addition to 
those generally ascribed to national fisheries development 
policies,  which  have  on  the  whole  concentrated  on 
increasing  production.  This  redirection  of  emphasis is 
important because it permits the search for solutions to 
the problem  of low standards of living in fishing com- 
munities to  expand beyond those areas which are fishery- 
specific. 
An  emphasis on technological solutions that sought 
to improve vessels  and gear has declined as  the funda- 
mental biological constraint of the 'open-access'  resources 
exploited by traditional fishermen has been appreciated 
and  as  both biological  and economic overfishing have 
been documented.'  Moreover, as evidence mounted that 
technology-based  development  programs  frequently 
exacerbated  income  inequalities  within  and  between 
communities,  the  relevant  constraints  to  raising  the 
standard  of  living came  to be  recognized  as  primarily 
socioeconomic and institutional in nature. Consequently, 
solutions are beginning to be sought within the context 
of rural development programs that have as their objec- 
tive a general uplifting of rural areas. Fisheries should be 
seen as encompassing input supply, production, and dis- 
tribution  sectors, each with linkages to other sectors in 
rural areas, thus necessitating an appreciation by planners 
and managers for the broad economic and social impact 
of fisheries programs that they may recommend. Despite 
'see  Ciriacy-Wantrup  and  Bishop  (1975)  for  the  useful 
distinction between  'openaccess' resource  and  'common  prop- 
erty'  resource.  An  emphasis on  'open-access' would  center on 
the  fact that  "the natural environment is available  for use by 
whoever chooses to use  it"  (Bromley  1979), that  is, upon use 
rather  than  ownership.  'Openaccess'  rather  than  'common- 
property' will be used in this monograph. 
the generalized approach implied by rural development 
schemes, however, there is a need to retain flexibility in 
programs and projects designed for fishing communities. 
Variability in resource availability and the heterogeneity 
of fishermen and fishing communitiesimply the necessity 
for  projects  that  are locale-specific, that take into ac- 
count the needs that fishermen themselves identify, and 
that appreciate the vertical and horizontal linkages that 
traditional  fisheries  and  fishing communites have  with 
other sectors and institutions. 
There  is  an  explicit link between  development pro- 
grams and supportive research endeavors. If the goal of 
development programs is  to raise the standard of living 
of traditional  fishing communities, the goal of research 
should be  to expand and clarify the alternative choices 
available to decision makers, be they government policy 
makers or project managers, private entrepreneurs, or fish- 
ermen themselves. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the problems 
of traditional small-scale fisheries and to establish a gen- 
eralized framework for productive research in this field. 
Following an overview of the sector, which concentrates 
on the Southeast Asian region, and which examines the 
goals and potentially  conflicting objectives of develop- 
ment  planning,  a  categorization  of  problems of tradi- 
tional  fisheries as  either  empirical  or  suppositional  is 
proposed.  The  former involves the concrete difficulties 
facing  fishermen such as  limited resources, inadequate 
vessels  and gear, lack of market power, lack of alterna- 
tive  income  sources, and  inflation.  The latter, on the 
other  hand,  involves  the  assumptions  that  decision 
makers bring to bear on matters of development policy, 
planning, and  research. It is  argued that fishermen and 
fishing-community-oriented  perspectives  are  essential 
to understanding the problems and prospects of develop- 
ment in this sector. 
After  tracing the changing emphasis of past develop- 
ment  programs, the paper discusses alternative develop- 
ment  strategies and  raises  the  relevant  research issues 
associated with  each. The paper concludes with  a dis- 
cussion of alternative approaches to traditional fisheries 
research and with recommendations for areas of concen- 
tration. An Overview of the Traditional Fisheries Sector 
Discussions  of  development  and  research  alter- 
natives  for traditional  fishermen inevitably begin, and 
not  infrequently  end, with  the question  'who  are the 
traditional,  or  small-scale  fishermen?'  While  a  broad 
concept of the sector is necessary for further discussion, 
specific  definitions appear to provide a less than  satis- 
factory base from which to begin. 
Classifications  of  fishing  activities into  small-scale 
or large-scale, inshore or offshore, artisanal or commer- 
cial  have  been  made  by  numerous national  bodies in 
attempts  to define the  target  group  for  development 
purposes and for collection of statistics. Most often, the 
separation into groups has been made by vessel size or 
power unit, by type of gear, by distance from shore, or 
by  some combination of these (SEAFDEC  1978). For 
example, Indonesia makes distinctions based on vessel 
size and whether  or not the vessel is motorized. In the 
Philippines, all fishermen using vessels over 3 t are con- 
sidered  commercial; all  fishermen  using vessels of less 
than 3 t or no vessel at all are considered municipal fish- 
ermen. While  Hong Kong and Singapore distinguish be- 
tween inshore and offshore fisheries, Thailand's  distinc- 
tion  between  small-scale and large-scale is based upon 
type of gear used. Malaysia takes into account vessel dis- 
placement, type of gear used, and area fished. Because of 
these differences, one will  find that what is considered 
small-scale in one country is large-scale in another; what 
is inshore in one is offshore in another. 
While such distinctions are practical and indeed useful 
within a national framework, narrow definitions are not 
so useful when attempting to gain a broad understanding 
of the traditional fisheries sector. Rather than attempting 
to be  specific, therefore,  one could more usefully talk 
about  ranges or rough categorizations of the technical 
and socioeconomic characteristics of the fishing activities 
of fishermen. For example, Kesteven (1  973,l  976), using 
such  an  approach, distinguishes among industrial, arti- 
sand,  and  subsistence  fishermen.  He  considers both 
industrial  and  artisanal fishermen  to be  commercially 
oriented, while  the catch of subsistence fishermen does 
not enter the market economy but is primarily for their 
own consumption or for barter trade. The vast majority 
of fishermen in the world fall into the artisanal and sub- 
sistence categories forming a continuum which in practice 
is difficult to separate in time and in space. It is to these 
two  groups, which  together  shall  be  considered tradi- 
tional  fishermen,  that  the  following  discussion is  ad- 
dressed.  Departing  from  Kesteven's  distinction,  the 
traditional  fisherman  category thus  overlaps the com- 
mercial category, with  a  resulting  distinction between 
industrial  fishermen  and  traditional  fishermen, rather 
than  between commercial and subsistence. The distinc- 
tion  between  industrial  and  traditional  fishermen  is 
therefore  primarily  one  of scale and management  and 
income levels, rather than of market orientation. 
Table 1 classifies industrial and traditional fishermen 
according to the characteristics established by Kesteven 
which  are:  fishing  unit,  boat  and  equipment,  fishing 
practices, investment level, catch per  fishing unit, pro- 
ductivity  per  fisherman,  disposal  of  catch, economic 
standing,  and  social  condition.  To these  components 
have  been  added:  ownership to reflect owner-operator 
relationships; time commitment to reflect the time spent 
by the fisherman in his fishing activity; and processing of 
catch to indicate degree  of processing and type of end 
user. Of  significance is the fact that this categorization is 
only indirectly related to the resources exploited by the 
fishermen,  reflecting  Kesteven's  point  of  view  that 
"artisanal  fishermen can participate in the exploitation 
of  most  resources,  and  are  favorably  placed  for  the 
exploitation  of  certain of  them"  (1976,  p.  132). This 
categorization of traditional  fishermen is not  resource- 
specific  and  therefore  covers  those  involved  in  both 
marine and inland fisheries. 
Summarizing from  Table  1, traditional  fisheries are 
carried  out by small-scale fishing units, often consisting 
of kin groups using small, occasionally powered-boats or 
none  at all.  The fishing activity is often part-time, and 
household income may be supplemented by other non- 
fishing activities of the fisherman. Payment to fishermen 
is on a share basis and vessels and gear are usually owner 
operated, as distinct from industrial fishing where there 
is more  distance between owners and fishermen. Gear, 
which may  be machine made such as nylon netting, is 
usually  operator-assembled and requires minimal or no 
machine  assistance  to  operate.  Investment  levels  are 
low, with capital often borrowed from those who mar- 
ket  the  catch. Catch per  fishing unit and productivity 
per  fisherman  range  from medium to very  low. Catch 
most often does not enter large organized markets, but is 
sold at dispersed points of landing or even at sea. Part or 
all of the catch is operator- and family-consumed. Tra- 
ditional  fishing  communities  are  frequently  isolated, 
both  geographically and  socially, and  the standard of 
living of traditional fishing households is low to minimal. 
The usefulness of this distinction between 'traditional' 
and 'industrial'  can be recognized through an example. A 
commonly used reef fishing method in the Philippines is 
the muro-ami, or  drive-in net. The method uses up to 
200 swimmers who drive the fish into the temporarily 
placed net with the use  of scare lines. While  the tech- 
nique  appears  to be  'traditional'  and  reminiscent  of Table 1. Comparison of technico-socioeconomic  situations of industrial and traditional fishermen. Categories (11, (4)-(lo), (12) and 
(13) are from Kesteven (1973). Phrases in parentheses are additions to or changes in Kesteven's characteristics. 
Commercial  Subsistence 
Artisanal 
Industrial  Traditional 
(1)  Fishing unit  Stable, with division of labor  Stable, small, specialized with  Lone operators, or family or 
and career prospect  no division of labor  community group 
(2)  Ownership  Concentrated in few hands,  Usually owned by senior  Widely dispersed among par- 
often non-operators  operator, or operators  ticipants 
jointly 
(3)  Tie  commitment  Usually full-time  Frequently part-time  Most often part-time 
(4)  Boat  Powered, much equipment  Small; inboard motor (or  None, or canoe 
small outboard) 
(5) Equipment  Machine-made, other assem-  Partly or wholly machii  Hand-made materials, 
bled  made materials, operator  operator assembled 
assembled 
(6)  Practices  Machineassisted  Minimal machine assistance  Hand~perated 
(7)  Investment  High; large proportion other  Low; entirely by operator  (Extremely low) 
than by operator  (frequently borrowed from 
buyer of catch) 
- (8)  Catches (per fishing unit)  Large  Medium or low  Low to very low 
(9)  Productivity (per fisher-  High 
man) 
Medium to low  Low  to  very low 
(10)  Disposal of catch  Sale to organized markets  Unorganized local sale,  Exclusively consumed by 
significant consumption by  operator, his family, and 
operator  friends; exchange by barter 
(1  1)  Processing of catch  Considerable for fishmeal and  Some drying, smoking,  Little or none; all for human 
other nonhuman consumption  salting; primarily human  consumption 
(12)  Operators's economic  Often high 
standing 
(13)  Social condition  Assimilated 
Lowest brackets  Minimal 
Often separated  Isolated communities 
similar methods used by whole communities in the South 
Pacific, the Philippine operation is supported by a large 
mother ship (up to 500 t), making the operation clearly 
'industrial'  by our earlier categorization. A similar tech- 
nique on asmaller scale, not supported by a mother ship, 
would be 'traditional.'  Distinctions that center on com- 
binations of technical and socioeconomic characteristics 
rather  than specific definitions appear  to provide  the 
broadest framework for our understanding of the sector 
and to shed the most light on the immediate problem at 
hand, which  is  the low standard of living of traditional 
fishing communities. 
Although  the  concept of  a  'standard  of living'  has 
many  facets  including income  levels, infant mortality 
rates,  nutrition, incidence of  disease  and  sickness, and 
educational achievement generally grouped among others 
as  'quality  of life,'  the major dimension by  which  the 
standard of living of traditional fishermen can be readily 
measured is income levels.  Above  all, it is low income 
levels that set traditional fishermen apart from owners of 
industrial fishing vessels. 
Despite the fact that information from the Southeast 
Asian region is neither complete nor consistent, it is pos- 
sible to provide a broad picture of problems of low in- 
come  from a few countries. Selected information from 
Indonesia,  Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand are pre- sented in Table 2. Annual per capita incomes of fisher- 
men are lower in all countries than average national per 
capita incomes. Income levels of fishing laborers, those 
who own no boat of their own, are particularly low, and, 
since the majority of traditional fishermen probably fall 
into this category (the ratio of fishermen to boats appears 
to be  roughly  2.5:1),  are  more  representative  of  the 
sector as  a whole than are the higher income levels of 
boat owners. There appears to be rough equivalence be- 
tween the extremely low levels of  fishing laborers' per 
capita incomes in both Indonesia ($56) and the Philip- 
pines  ($60).  The  higher  household  income  of  boat 
owners  in  the  Philippines  ($821)  than  in  Indonesia 
($455)  is  probably  traceable, at  least  in  part,  to the 
higher percentage of motorized vessels in the Philippines 
(46%) than in Indonesia (2%). Annual household income 
of Philippine fishermen using nonmotorized vessels was 
$677 while  per  capita income was  $106 (Herrin et al. 
1978), both  closer  to the Indonesian  boat  operators' 
household  and  per  capita  averages  of  $455 and  $81, 
respectively. 
In  addition  to  being  absolutely  low,  fishermen's 
incomes exhibit marked  seasonality.  For  example, on 
the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, the northeast dry 
monsoon reduces the number of fishing days per month 
from 21 to 6 and the number of fishing hours per trip 
from 14 to 6 (Siwar and Ngah  1977). Fishing effort is 
thus reduced to oneeighth of nonmonsoon levels, and the 
result is that during the monsoon period, 94% of fisher- 
men have household incomes below the M$230 monthly 
poverty income level arbitrarily established by the gov- 
ernment. This compares to 77% below this poverty level 
during nonmonsoon months. 
Table 2. Fishing household income levels ($US) in Southeast Asia. 
Regardless of absolute levels of incomes, changes in 
purchasing power provide a more accurate indication of 
the seriousness of the situation in most developing coun- 
tries.  According to the Asian  Development Bank in al- 
most  all  developing countries, "there  is evidence of a 
decline in  real  wages  in  the  1970's .  .  .  brought about 
by the runaway inflation in the 1972-1974  period" (1977, 
p.  53).  Traditional fishermen, despite the higher prices 
that their catch may bring, are on balance probably ad- 
versely affected due to the higher costs of fuel and other 
inputs. Fishermen themselves indicate in personal inter- 
views  that  their  standard of  living  is  worsening.  For 
example compilation of responses from  16 barrios sur- 
veyed since 1975 in the Philippines shows that only 22% 
of respondents believe their economic condition has im- 
proved within the last 5 yr (Baum  and Maynard  1976a, 
b,c,d,e;  Herrin  et  al. 1978;  Gagni  and  Luna  1978; 
Rubio et al.  1978). Even if one treats these results with 
some reservation, the situation is clearly alarming. 
Because incomes are low throughout the rural sector, 
it is not low fishing incomes alone that have attracted 
the attention of national governments. These traditional 
fisheries are important to national economies most fre- 
quently measured by the contribution to GNP,  by refer- 
ence to nutritional aspects, such as annual per capita fish 
consumption  or  the percentage of  protein intake con- 
tributed by fisheries products, or by the numbers of fish- 
ermen employed. With regard to the first two criteria, it 
should be pointed out that industrial and traditional fish- 
eries'  contributions are usually combined, and disaggre- 
gation is difficult. In addition to the above quantifiable 
aspects, fishing and  other rural activities are viewed as 
important  contributors to the  stability of  rural  com- 
Fishermen 
Annual  Annual  Annual average 
household  per capita  national 
income  income  per capita 
income (1974) 
Operator  Laborer  Operator  Laborer 
Indonesia  $455  262  8 1  56 
Philippines  $821  340  127  60 
Malaysia  498  92 
Thailand  210-374  n.a. 
n.a.:  Not available 
Sources of data: 
Indonesia  :  Atmowasono (1977) 
Philippines :  Herrin et al. (1978) 
Malaysia  :  Labon (1974). Family size of 5.4 for Trengganu (Siwar and Ngah  1977) used to estimate per capita 
income. 
Thailand  :  Cole and Anand (1975). 
National per capita income fwres  from Gale Research Co. (1975). munities.  Raising  the  standard  of  living of traditional 
fishing communities is thus seen in part  as a means of 
slowing rural-urban population drift. 
Unfortunately,  it must  be  emphasized that  reliable 
statistics regarding  traditional  fisheries are notoriously 
hard  to  come  by.  In  Southeast  Asia,  however, it is 
possible  to develop an appreciation for the significance 
of  traditional  fisheries through an examination of the 
role of fisheries, including industrial and traditional, in 
terms  of  percentage  contribution  to GNP,  of  contri- 
bution  to nutrition, and  of employment. As  indicated 
in Table 3, fisheries employ from 0.5% (Singapore) to 
5.5% (Vietnam) of the economically active population 
and  contribute  from  0.3% (Singapore)  to 6.7% (Kam- 
puchea) of the value of GNP. A further indication of the 
important role  of fisheries in terms of nutrition of the 
region is a range of 7.6 kg (People's Republic of China) 
to 48.1 kg (Hong Kong) annual per capita fish consump- 
tion. Additionally, fish makes up over 40% of the animal 
protein intake in most countries in the Southeast Asian 
region. 
Traditional fishermen far outnumber industrial fisher- 
men. Estimates of the numbers of traditional small-scale 
fishermen in  developing countries worldwide  reach  as 
high as 15 million (URI  1975). If this estimate is taken 
to cover  those  who  are  essentially  full-time, and this 
certainly appears reasonable, the inclusion of those who 
are part-time would raise the estimate significantly. The 
sector's  contribution to employment is further increased 
by  inclusion  of  those  input  suppliers, processors and 
other middlemen also dependent upon the resource for 
their livelihood. 
Moving from a worldwide perspective, it is possible to 
make  some  very  rough estimates of numbers of tradi- 
tional  marine fishermen in  the Southeast Asian  region 
based  in part  upon extrapolation from published infor- 
mation on catch and gear  types (SCS  1973). It is esti- 
mated  that 45%  of the South China Sea catch is from 
trawls, purse seines, and drift nets. An  additional 4%  is 
such locally important gear as longlines, bagnets, muro- 
mi, liftnets,  and  trolling and  6.4%  from  sea  mussel 
collecting.  The  remaining  45% or  2.1  million  mt  (of 
which  0.93 million mt are estimated to come from the 
People's Republic of China),is caught by 'other fisheries,' 
which  one can presume  to be  primarily traditional, or 
small-scale. Expanding the  scope of available statistics 
beyond  the  South China Sea to include Indonesia and 
catch from those countries in the region that fish beyond 
Table 3. Selected indicators of the role of fisheries (industrial, traditional) in national economies. 
Fisheries  Per capita  % of animal 
employment  Fisheries  fish  protein 
Employment  as % of  as % of  consumption  derived 
Countrylregion  fisheries  labor force  GNP  kglyr  fish 
Brunei  360  1  .4a  N.A.  N. A.  N.A. 
China  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  7.6  N.A. 
Hong Kong  45,000  3.1a  N.A.  48.1  29.7 
Indonesia  1,081,000  2.4  3.4  10.2  65.3b 
Kampuchea  40,600  1.2  6.7  25.4  68.0 
Malaysia  81,700  1.9  2.2  25.7  47.6 
Philippines  687,900  4.8  3.6  24.2  54.0 
Singapore  2,200  .5a  0.3  41.5  42.8 
Taiwan  298,000~  5.2  2.4  39.1d  N.Af 
Thailand  64,277e  1.7  3.2  19.1  50.4 
Vietnam  317,4001  5Sa  5.2g  15.1g  67.2 
N.A.:  Not available. 
Source: Except where noted, FA0 (1973) Fisheries Circular 314. Labor force figures, from which the fisheries employ- 
ment  as % of labor force was computed, are from ADB  (1978), except as noted below. Note the extremely 
high protein consumption of Hong Kong and Singapore. The estimate for Hong Kong appears questionable. 
a~ased  on estimates of economically active population as reported in ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics (1970). 
b~adiwidjaja  and Sumintawikarta (1970) estimate 81.3%.  . 
 ahmu mud (1970) estimates 69.1%. 
dChang (1976). 
e~isheries  Record of Thailand (1975). 
fChakrabandhu (1970) estimates 53.9%. 
g~outh  Vietnam only. Per capita fish consumption is average of North and South Vietnam as reported in Marr (1976). the South China Sea increases the percentage share of 
total catch from traditional fisheries to 58% and allows 
an  estimate  of  approximately  3.5  million  traditional 
small-scale  marine  fishermen  in  the  Southeast  Asian 
region (see Table 4 for derivation of this estimate). 
It should be pointed out that these estimates are based 
on  extrapolation  using  two  figures:  (1)  the estimated 
percentage of total marine catch caught by traditional 
fishermen and (2) the estimated weighted average annual 
catch per fisherman (1.33 mt) derived from numbers of 
traditional fishermen based on numerous and occasionally 
conflicting sources  for  6  of  the  11 countries in  the 
Southeast Asian region. Consequently it is important to 
stress that the resulting figures should be viewed as only 
a rough guide. 
Constructing similar data for the Southwest Pacific is 
much more difficult. FA0 catch data for this region are 
incomplete and understated due to the nonreporting of 
subsistence catch data from outlying islands where fish, 
molluscs, and crustaceans are used almost exclusively for 
home consumption. Since no reliable estimates are avail- 
able  on  numbers  of  fishermen, I have  made  what  is 
probably'a conservative estimate of 5% of the population 
or 230,000 traditional fishermen engaged  at least part- 
time  in  capture  or  gathering. The  total  for  the  two 
regions thus approaches 4 million. 
The number of traditional fishermen within the South- 
east Asian and Southwest Pacific regions is thus extreme- 
ly high, ranging on a national basis from lows of a few 
hundred in Brunei and Singapore, to hundreds of thou- 
sands in the Philippines, the Southwest Pacific, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam, to almost a million in Indonesia and over 
1.5 million in China. If  one assumes an average family 
size of six, there are approximately 25 million people in 
these  two regions alone  directly  dependent  upon  tra- 
ditional marine fisheries for their livelihood. The inclu- 
sion of traditional inland fisheries and  of collectors of 
molluscs  (e.g.,  Thailand)  for  which  few statistics are 
available would further increase these estimates. 
In addition to numbers of fishermen, the importance 
of the traditional fisheries sector is apparent from the 
goal-setting that results from national planning exercises. 
As  observed by  Lawson (1974,  1978), Lampe  (1976), 
and  Engvall  (1978),  the  most  common objectives of 
fisheries development plans are (1)  to increase output; 
(2) to increase export earnings; (3) to raise income levels; 
and (4) to maintain or increase employment. 
The first objective is based primarily upon a desire to 
meet  nutritional  requirements  of  rapidly  expanding 
populations. The  second  objective  reflects an interest 
primarily in  development of industrial fisheries for ex- 
port purposes. However, there are cases consistent with 
Kesteven's  earlier  point  regarding access of traditional 
fishermen to most resources, where traditional fisheries 
can benefit from the expansion of export markets. For 
example, a significant proportion  of the shrimp that is 
destined  for export  from Indonesia is  caught by tradi- 
tional  fishermen. In  the  Philippines, those  traditional 
fishermen catching tuna species often sell their catch at 
sea either directly to Japanese vessels or to  larger indus- 
trial vessels operating out of the major ports who in turn 
sell their catch to exporters. The third and fourth objec- 
tives  have  direct bearing upon the traditional fisheries 
sector which has been shown to be the major employer 
in  most  national fisheries, and in which income levels 
are universally low. 
It  would  be  a  simple  world  indeed if  these major 
objectives  could  be  simultaneously  achieved.  Unfor- 
tunately, there are inherent conflicts among them, the 
reconciliation of which requires the setting of priorities 
by  national  fisheries planning  bodies. For example, if 
one  assumes that  output  increases are to be  achieved 
through modernization of fishing fleets, the labor input 
will  be  reduced  and  employment  will  decline.  Trends 
around the world have demonstrated the inevitability of 
the  capitalization process in  'open-access'  resource ex- 
ploitation. In  response, deliberate steps such as cldsure 
of  coastal areas to trawlers are undertaken to maintain 
more labor-intensive operations, that is, to legislate in- 
efficiency. 
Additional conflicts are also apparent between a con- 
sumer orientation and a producer orientation. Often im- 
plicit  in  the  first  objective of increasing output is the 
desire to increase the availability of cheap protein. If one 
assumes that increases in total output are possible through 
expansion of the industrial fishing fleet (and as shall be 
shown, this is not necessarily a valid assumption), prices 
will be lower than they otherwise would have been had 
reliance  remained  on  the  traditional fishing fleet, and 
output therefore not increased. The lower prices imply a 
lower income for the fi~hermen.~  In other words, what 
is best for the national economy in the form of increased 
fish  production  and  protein  availability may  produce 
better incomes for only a small number of fishermen and 
could  actually reduce those of many more (Crutchfield 
et al.  1974). As in agricultural settings in other parts of 
the world, the government may choose to subsidize either 
producer or consumer or both. Short of such direct inter- 
vention in the market process, however, priorities must 
be established among these various conflicting objectives. 
'This  is an  oversimplification because the change in revenue 
(income) resulting from the increased supply depends upon the 
elasticities of demand and supply, and upon whether the maxi- 
mum  sustainable yield (MSY)  has  already been surpassed. See 
pages 25-27 for elaboration of this point. Table 4: Estimated numbers of traditional fishermen (marine) and annual catch per fisherman in the Southeast Asian 
and Southwest Pacific regions. 
Estimated 
Total  % from  Marine catch  no. of  Annual catch 
marine catch  small-sc~  small-scale  small-scale  per fisherman 
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a~ven  though separate national statistics are available in a few cases, for consistency, marine catch estimates are com- 
iled from FA0  (1977), except for Taiwan data which originate from Table 1, Man (1976). 
'Based  on average of Sarawak and Sabah from Table 1, SCS (1973). 
y estimate based on Solecki (1966). SCS (1973)  estimate is 100% for 1971. 
%sed  on 'other  fisheries' category, Table 1, SCS (l973),  unless noted otherwise. Malaysia includes lift nets. 
e~idarto  and Atmowasono (1977). 
f~amson  (1977). SCS (1973)  estimate is 59% for 1970. 
g~isheries  Statistics of Indonesia (1972). 
h~~~ (1973)  reports 26,000 vessels in coastal fishing. Assuming ratio of fishermen to vessels of 2.5:1, estimated num- 
per of fishermen is 65,000. 
%CS (1973)  reports that one-third of Singapore's 794 vessels in 1971 were engaged in coastal fishing. Assuming 2.5 
fishermen per  vessel  gives an estimate of 650  fishermen. Note, however, that the results in an average catch of 6.98 
mt per fisherman, a figure that subjectively appears tobe  too high. 
'~ubray  and Isarankura (1974)  report 36,000 fishing craft, all but 3,200 devoted to artisanal fishing, and a fisheries 
population  of 270,000. Fisheries Record of Thailand (1975)  reports 64,277 fishermen. The number of traditional 
Ishermen is probably around 60,000,  not including sea mussel collectors whose number is not known. 
'SCS  (1973)  reports  75,000 vessels in coastal fishing. Assuming ratio of 2.5  fishermen per vessel, estimated number 
pf fishermen is 187,500.  URI (1975)  estimates number at 300,000,  including inland water. 
Neither  estimates of numbers of small-scale fishermen, nor  annual catch estimates per  fiherman are available for 
Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Kampuchea, and Taiwan. Numbers of fishermen are estimated for these countries using 
the weighted average catch of 1.33  mt per fisherman for other countries in the region. 
m~igures  for total marine  catch are FA0 estimates of total catch. Freshwater catch is. assumed negligible. Australia 
and New Zealand are excluded. 
"FAO  (1977). Pod  (1972)  and ADB (1978)  estimate a higher figure of 80,000 t. 
'MY  estimate, assuming 5% of the population of 4.6 million involved in fishing and gathering, at least part-time. The  conflicts among  stated  objectives  arise in part 
due to the inherent divergent interests of various groups, 
including mral poor producers and urban poor consumers, 
and  in  part because of naive views or tacit assumptions 
regarding the limitlessness of the fisheries resource. These 
views  of unlimited  fishery resources have  persisted for 
hundreds of years and were apparent in fisheries develop- 
ment  programs  and  projects  as  recently  as  the early 
1970s. 
Our  present  interests are somewhat more parochial 
than  an  examination  of  ways  and  means to reconcile 
these conflicting objectives, although their outline aids 
in  understanding the importance of the fisheries sector. 
As  stated in the introduction, the purpose of this pre- 
sentation is to examine the major problems of the tra- 
ditional fishermen  and  the  contribution that  research 
can make to their resolution. Implied, therefore, is the 
belief  that a priority of research must be to aid in the 
development  of  programs  that  seek  to raise  income 
levels  and  the standards of living in  traditional fishing 
communities. 
The Problems Facing Traditional Fishermen : 
The Fisherman's Perspective 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LOW  STANDARD 
OF LIVING 
To this point, it has been emphasized that the prob- 
lem  of  traditional fishermen is that of  a low standard 
of living, or more specifically, low incomes. There are, of 
course, many contributing factors to this general problem, 
and  an examination of  the major  factors will  assist in 
identifying possible  solutions to which research thrusts 
can be related. 
When  examining traditional fisheries, it is  useful  to 
distinguish between two kinds of factors contributing to 
the low standard of living. Empirical factors, on the one 
hand, involve the concrete situation faced by fishermen 
and  the communities in which they live. Suppositional, 
or analytic factors, on the other hand, involve the assump- 
tions  and  approaches that  decision  makers use  when 
defining and trying to solve empirical problems. 
To a certain extent, empirical and suppositional fac- 
tors are related in that empirical problems can flow from 
suppositional  problems. For example, the lack of  ade- 
quate vessels and gear or lack of market power which are 
classified here as empirical problems result in part from 
national  development  priorities  and  their  attendant 
assumptions. The best example of the causal relationship 
relates to the 'open-access' nature of the fAery resource. 
By  tacitly  assuming  unlimited  resources, governments 
have  been  able to rationalize the issuing  of licenses to 
industrial fishermen in some  countries on such a scale 
that contributes to conflicts with traditional fishermen. 
There  are three kinds of empirical problems-biolog- 
ical, technological and socioeconomic-that  face the tra- 
ditional fishermen. These areas have  often been treated 
separately by the respective disciplines involved. Instead, 
they should be treated as complementary and interacting. 
For example where  overfishing already occurs, policies 
aimed at increasing fishing effort in a traditional fishery 
may be self-defeating. At the same time, the lack of more 
and better information about biological aspects of a fish- 
ery should not be allowed to postpone attention to the 
socioeconomic and institutional problems of traditional 
fishing communities. 
The major empirical problems that contribute to low 
incomes and low standards of living are limited fisheries 
resources, inadequate vessels and gear, lack of alternative 
income  sources, lack  of  market  power,  and  inflation 
(Figure  1). While, for sake of simplicity, Figure 1 indi- 
cates  these  as  separate  contributing  factors,  there  is 
clearly  interaction  and  reinforcement  among  them, 
making the  figure  reminiscent in  some  aspects to the 
'vicious  circle of poverty' identified by Nurkse (1953) as 
an explanation for agricultural stagpation. For example 
limited  resources  of  an  'open-access'  nature by  them- 
selves do not lead to low incomes unless entry of fisher- 
men  is  unchecked.  The  lack  of  alternative  income 
opportunities in the rural sector which intensifies fishing 
effort  then  couples  with  limited  resources  to reduce 
income levels. We  will return to a discussion of solutions 
after examining these empirical problems, or contribut- 
ing factors in detail. 
Empirical problems must be put into a human context. 
What do they mean to the poorest of fishing households? 
On  extreme days when bad weather precludes any fish- 
ing  from the small barrios of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, 
for  example, it  means that the  day's  meals consist of 
rice  and salt and nothing more. Even on good days the 
catch is so low that it does not go far when sold in order 
to purchase other necessities. It means that some families 
have  never  consulted a doctor, even though several are 
located only a few kilometers away, because they can 
not afford the nominal  fee. It means that the family's 
sole possessions, besides its single room nipa palm house 
and  the clothes they are wearing, are cooking utensils 
and  some sleeping mats.  It means that with no savings 
and no material possessions, the poorest fishing families 1. Limited Resources 
SOLUTIONS: 
INCREASE  RETURNS TO  FISHING 
(HIOHER CATCH,  HIGHER [PICES,  OR  LOWER  COST) 
-$#-I  UPGRADEVESSELSANDGEAR 
IMPROVE MARKETING AND  DEVELOP 
POSTHARVEST TECHNOLOGY  ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT 
Fig.  1.  Empirical  problems  of  traditional  fishermen  and 
possible solutions. 
can never hope to secure loans for gear purchase from 
collateral-minded banks, whose experience with previous 
loans to fishermen has been anything but rewarding. It 
means  that  with  little or no education, and  few non- 
fishing skills, the poorest fishermen have little hope of 
shifting to another occupation. It would be easy to be- 
come overly emotional regarding these  conditions, but 
they need to be kept in mind as composite figures docu- 
ment these empirical problems. Empirical problems have 
a human scale and perspective that make  them appear 
overwhelming to the families directly affected. 
The major empirical problems that contribute to the 
above set of conditions will be discussed here. Also con- 
sidered is a subset of difficulties  associated with the 'open- 
access' nature of the resource; specifically, the two prob- 
lems of surplus fishermen and conflicts between the.tra- 
ditional and the industrial fishing sectors. The choice of 
major empirical factors and the elimination at this time 
of  others  (e.g.,  waste  in  distribution) is  a  deliberate 
attempt to encourage initially a view of these problems 
from the perspective of the traditional fishermen. Sup- 
positional problems, on the other hand, will deal with 
the problems of the traditional fisheries sector from the 
perspective of nonfishermen. 
Status of stocks:  Fish  stocks,  though  providing  a 
flow resource, are finite. Underlying all concerns about 
low  income  levels is  the  growing indication that  the 
demersal, reef, and to some extent the pelagic resources 
upon  which  the  traditional  fishermen  depend  are  all 
biologically  and economically overexploited. While  the 
individual  fisherman, especially  one who faces a daily 
problem  of survival, may  not see 'open-access' and the 
resulting  overexploitation as  his problem, he  certainly 
feels it in terms of low productivity and conflicts with 
the industrial fishing sector. 
Economists  and  biologists either using their respec- 
tive concepts of overfishing, or more frequently combin- 
ing them in bioeconomic terms, are reaching much the 
same general conclusion regarding the status of stocks in 
the region. Although information on the level of exploita- 
tion of the coastal resources is fragmented and somewhat 
mixed, and there are exceptions, the general trend towards 
biological  and  economic  overfishing  appears  evident. 
Biological overfishing results from a level of effort which 
produces catch beyond the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY).  A distinction is usually made between 'growth' 
and  'recruitment'  overfishing, either  one  or  both  of 
which  can lead to biological overfishing.  "The  latter is 
a reduction in stock caused by recruitment failure under 
the  pressure  of  heavy  fishing, but  growth overfishing 
occurs when  the little  fish are caught before they have 
had a chance to grow" (Cushing  1977, p. 232). Econom- 
ic overfishing, on the other hand, results from a level of 
effort  which  produces  catch  beyond  the  maximum 
economic yield (MEY).  MEY is that point on the yield 
curve that maximizes net revenue, that is, where Total 
Revenue (TR) minus Total Cost (TC)  is at its maximum 
(Figures 4-6).  MEY  will always be associated with levels 
of effort less than those which produce MSY. 
Several  authors  (Lawson  1975;  Pathansali  1976; 
Yap  1977) indicate that the resources of the west coast 
of  Peninsular  Malaysia, particularly the  demersal  and 
semi-pelagic species, are  already fully exploited. Over- 
fishing is documented by Yap (1977) who shows over the 
period  1969-1974 (1) a fall in landings per unit of fishing 
effort; (2) a fall in total landings; and (3) an increase of 
trash  fish  as a percentage of total  catch. For the east 
coast  of  Malaysia, in  contrast,  Pathansali (1976)  esti- 
mates that a potential three-fold increase in landings of 
demersal  and  semi-pelagic  species  could  be  achieved 
from an average of 35,000 tin 1967-1971  to  95-130,000 t. 
However, this depends on the fishery's expanding to the 
offshore areas by use of trawlers. 
For Indonesia, Satari and Soewardi (1973) report the 
overexploitation of the Malacca Straits and the near over- exploitation of the coastal seas north of Java but believe 
that  other  areas  near  Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Irian 
Jaya are still underexploited. 
In the Philippines, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources  (BFAR)  has  identified several  areas  which 
have  shown  decreasing  yields.  Assuming  constant  or 
increased effort was applied in each case over the period 
of  observed  decline, the  following areas appear to be 
overexploited: Manila  Bay; Panquil Bay; Sorsogon Bay; 
Pagapas  Bay;  Tinagong-Dagat, Capiz;  San  Miguel Bay, 
Camarines  Sur; Bantayan  Island, Cebu; Maqueda  Bay 
and  Villareal  Bay  in  Samar; a  portion  of Zamboanga 
Channel;  Lingayen  Gulf; San Pedro  Bay;  Asid  Gulf; 
Polillo Island in Quezon; and Puerto Galera in Oriental 
Mindoro. Of  these, Malampaya Sound in Palawan has 
been closed to commercial fishing, although municipal 
(vessel  < 3  t)  fishing is  still  permitted.  In  addition, 
commercial  fishing is  prohibited within  7  km of  the 
coastline of Samar, Leyte, and Sorsogon provinces. 
The  overfishing  that  has  occurred throughout  the 
Gulf of Thailand, and the subsequent venturing of the 
trawl fishery to fishing grounds further afield have been 
well  documented elsewhere (Bangkok Post  1974; Marr 
1976; Marr et al.  1976). Silva, in a report to the Indian 
Ocean  Fishery  Survey  and  Development  Programme 
(1973), reported that trawlers formerly operating in the 
Gulf  of Thailand were  in  that year ranging from Bang- 
ladesh  in  the  Northwest  to  the  Straits  of  Malacca. 
The effect of overexploitation of these Gulf of Thai- 
land fish stocks on the traditional coastal fisheries is not 
clear. However, one would think that they would be ad- 
versely  affected both for biological reasons and due to 
increased  competition  from  trawlers.  However,  Silva 
(1973) holds out hope that all demersal species are not 
yet  fully exploited due to the rough coral strewn bot- 
tom, and claims there is still the potential for a hook- 
and-line fishery. A similar implication is apparent from 
the  experimental  trawl  and  echo-sounding results re- 
ported by  Aprieto and Patolot (1977) and Aprieto and 
Villoso (1977, p. 81) who state "cursory analysis of the 
echo-sounder tracings indicated an apparent abundance 
of fish in the Visayan Sea." 
It has been  estimated that for the South China Sea, 
the  potential  catch  is  3.45 million t  (Aoyama  1973). 
The geographical breakdown of this projected catch and 
the areas for which potential increases were thought to 
be possible is shown in Table 5. In the 4 yr since Aoyarna's 
(1973)  estimate,  demersal  catches  have  increased  to 
approximately  3.7  million  t, so  it would  appear that 
for  the region  as  a whole the maximum  demersal sus- 
tainable  yield  has  now been  reached, if not surpassed 
(Pauly  1979),  although  certain  smaller  areas  where 
limited expansion is still possible may remain. 
Table  5.  Present  and  potential demersal catches in the South 
China Sea. Data  are  from Aoyama (1973). Note that by 1977, 
demersal catch reached  3.7 million metric tons, thus exceeding 
Aoyama's estimate of MSY. 
Present catch 
(1,000 mt)  Potential catch 
Area  1972  (1,000 mt) 
Mainland Shelf  553.5  956 
Northern  293.5 
Gulf of Tonkin  128.2 
Southern  132.0 
Sunda Shelf  1,192.6 
Northern  375.9 
Gulf of Thailand  653.9 
Central  30.6 
Southern  72.0 
Eastern  60.2 
Philippines Region  335.0  420 
South China Sea Basin  0  59 
Straits of Malacca  428.8  400 
Total  2,509.9  3,453 
- 2510 
Potential increase (as of 1972):  943 
Of  course, the status of demsrsal stocks gives only a 
partial picture of the status and potential of traditional 
fisheries.  Many  reef  fishes  are  not included  in  these 
demersal estimates, and in one country, the Philippines, 
up to 23% of all traditional fisheries catch is estimated 
to derive  from coral reef areas (Carpenter  1977). Gear 
used  by  traditional fishermen  to capture reef  fish  are 
traps, hook-and-line, drive-in nets, gillnets and makeshift 
spear guns. The use of dynamite, poison, and small-mesh 
traps, however, threatens these resources.also. Even the 
smallest  of  fish are caught for consumption and orna- 
mental  fish  for  export.  In the Philippines, the export 
value of ornamentals rose from approximately $100,000 
in  1970 to over $5 million in  1976 (Fisheries Statistics 
of the Philippines  1975). The sodium cyanide used to 
gather  ornamental  fish,  however,  is  damaging to the 
coral reef itself. 
In  contrast  to  the  Southeast  Asian  region  where 
demersal  and  pelagic  catches predominate, coral  reef 
fisheries  prevail in the Southwest Pacific as  far as tra- 
ditional fishermen are concerned, and many coral atolls 
are clearly overfished (personal observations 1969-1972). 
Development efforts in the Pacific have concentrated on 
outer-reef rather  than  inner-reef programs  as a result. 
In addition to coral reef  fisheries, traditional fisher- 
men  also exploit pelagic stocks. For example, tuna and 
anchovy make up 46% of the catch of municipal fisher- men  in  Libertad, Misarnis Oriental, Philippines (Herrin 
et al.  1978). Traditional fishermen thus exploit diverse 
resources, the degree  of overfishing varying from coun- 
try to country, but with  an overall trend to inevitable 
biological and economic overfishing. 
Low  productivity:  The immediate effect of limited 
and overexploited fisheries resources available to tradi- 
tional fishermen is, of course, low productivity per fish- 
erman.  The  low  catches  that  along  with  low  prices 
contribute to low incomes (summarized in Table 4) were 
found to average 1.33 mt annually per fisherman in the 
Southeast Asian  region.3  Assuming approximately 200 
fishing  trips  per  yr  (this  was  the  average  for  the  16 
Philippine barrios cited earlier) catch per  fisherman per 
trip is less than 7 kg.  Scant information on productivity 
is  available  from  the Southwest Pacific, although one 
study  (Alkire  1965) estimated annual  catch  rates  for 
fishermen on the small atoll of Larnotrek to be only 360 
kg, with the average fishing effort of 90 dlyr, implying a 
catch per fisherman per trip of only 4 kg. 
Just as  average  income  figures do not provide infor- 
mation on the distribution or range of incomes, neither do 
these catch figures provide information on the range of 
productivity. In Indonesia, however, based on data pre- 
sented  in  Collier, Hadikoesworo, and  Saropie (1977), 
annual  catch  per  fisherman  for  traditional  sailboats 
ranges  from  0.25  mt  with handlines to 5.2  mt  with 
gillnets. In Misamis  Oriental, in  the Philippines annual 
catch  for  operators of motorized bancas was  approxi- 
mately 2.6 mt, while operators of nonmotorized bancas 
caught only 1.0 mt on the average, despite making 20% 
more trips per yr (Herrin et al.  1978). 
One  might  be  tempted to conclude from these data 
that  the  key  to improving fishermen's  incomes lies in 
improving vessels and gear since it is apparent that owners 
of motorized boats and users of nets have higher produc- 
tivity than those using less sophisticated gear. However, 
as is convincingly shown by Gibbons (1976), the effects 
of  such modernization are apparently felt  only by the 
very  few.  Despite  the  overall  modernization  of  the 
Malaysian fisheries sector and increased national catches, 
78% of  the Chinese  and  85% of  the Malay  traditional 
fishermen in Penang and Kedah have a per capita adult 
equivalent monthly income of less than MWO (US$l6.40). 
The  traditional  fishermen  in  these two areas have, on 
the whole, invested neither their capital nor their labor 
in the more productive techniques. This aspect of vessel 
30f course low productivity is only part of the picture. With 
high  valued  species, and depending upon elasticities of supply 
and  demand,  low  productivity (in terms of kg)  may  result in 
higher  incomes.  Such  situations  tend  to  be  the  exception, 
however. 
and gear improvement will be  elaborated on in a later 
section. 
Surplus  jishermen  and  lack  of alternative  income 
sources:  Two important socioeconomic problems evolve 
from the  finiteness of  the resource base  and from its 
'open-access'  nature.  These  are  the  volatile issues  of 
(1)  surplus fishermen and (2) conflicts with the indus- 
trial  fishery. The  importance of each issue is a direct 
function of the extent to which the resources presently 
tapped by traditional and industrial fishermen are over- 
exploited. 
Surplus labor has been  estimated in Malaysian  fish- 
eries (Fisheries Division  1971) at 19,300, two-thirds of 
which is on the West  Coast. These estimates were based 
upon a supposed optimum crew size per vessel assuming 
static  technology and  resource  availability. As  Lawson 
(1975) correctly points out, such an estimate is not valid 
when additional resources and improved technology are 
available as  they are on the East Coast, albeit offshore. 
Lawson goes on to calculate that what surplus labor does 
exist on the East Coast will be absorbed by the alternative 
activities that will  be  generated by the Malaysian Fish- 
eries Development  Plan  (Labon  1974).  Since most  of 
these alternative activities are projected to be in indus- 
trial  fishing  and  in  land-based aquaculture, there is a 
reason to question this optimism. There has not been to 
date  a  clear  indication that  development of  either of 
these sectors directly benefits large numbers of traditional 
fishermen.  For  example Malaysia's  experience on  the 
West Coast and Thailand's experience indicate that those 
absorbed by the industrial fishing sector are more likely 
to be  unemployed urban youth than former traditional 
fishermen (Yap  1977). 
Some encouragement can be  taken from experience 
on Malaysia's  East Coast where limited numbers of tra- 
ditional fishermen have  been absorbed (C.  Bailey, pers. 
comm.).  However, the absorptive capacity of the indus- 
trial fishery is far from clear. Moreover, based on exten- 
sive  personal exposure to fishing community problems 
in Java, Collier et al. (1977) believe that large numbers 
of traditional fishermen will not be  easily attracted to 
full-time  laborer  work  in  capital  intensive fishponds, 
with their low labor requirements. 
In the Philippines, the BFAR 'Blue  Revolution' pro- 
gram  is  perhaps  more  realistically  concentrating on 
species such as oysters, mussels, and seaweed (primarily 
Eucheuma) that can be  cultured in the foreshore area 
with  minimal  investment  and  thus  might  be  more 
attractive  to  traditional  fishermen  as  a  supplemental 
source of income. A study of Eucheuma  farming based 
on comparative data from the Aru  Islands in Indonesia 
and  Tawi-Tawi  in  the Philippines indicates, however, 
that seaweed farming has attracted, on a part-time basis, many  nonfishermen  such  as  teachers  and  government 
employees  in  addition  to fishermen,  indicating  that 
special legislation may be required if these activities are 
to be resewed for traditional fishermen (L.  Hollenbeck, 
pers.  comm.).  While  community profiles in the Philip- 
pines show that alternative household activities, particu- 
larly  those of other household members, are providing 
an increasing proportion of total household income, this 
does not mean  that  nonfishing income  or total house- 
hold income is increasing; it may only reflect a decline 
in the proportion provided by fishing activities. 
Relatively little is known about the comparative rates 
of  return  from or the marginal productivity of labor in 
alternative  activities in  the rural coastal areas, that is, 
what is  the opportunity wage  of traditional fishermen? 
Such data could provide important clues as to the move- 
ment  of  labor  into  or out of  traditional fisheries and 
factors that constrain mobility. Are traditional fisheries 
the economic activity of last resort? Cordell (1973) con- 
cluded  it  is, at least for canoe fishing communities in 
Northeast Brazil that had to abandon their estuary fish- 
ing due to the superior technology of  other fishermen 
and  were  "forced  to  colonize  an  inferior  niche,  the 
[mangrove]  swamp"  (p.  32).  Laborers  released  from 
nearby  coconut  plantations  had  few  alternatives  ex- 
cept  canoe  fishing,  thus  placing  further  pressure  on 
the  resource.  While  Cordell  was  careful  not  to gen- 
eralize  to  other  fisheries, there is indirect evidence in 
Asia that fishing is a last resort activity for many. 
Estimates  for Malaysia indicate that the number of 
traditional fishermen are increasing (Larsson et al. 1975). 
Increases  in  the number  of fishermen using  small sail- 
boats in  Java  are reported by Collier et al. (1977) who 
point out that it is fishing, not land-based activities such 
as  rice  farming and brackishwater pond culture, that is 
more likely to attract marginal workers and the landless. 
Not only are absolute investment requirements lower in 
fishing, the 'open-access'  nature of  the  resource allows 
the newcomer to begin the activity with relative ease. In 
Thailand, while the number of fishermen apparently de- 
clined between 1967 and 1970, the percentage of fishing 
families that  depended solely on fishing as their source 
of income increased from 42% to 60% during this period 
(Tiews  1976). 
The size of the rural landless labor force appears to be 
growing throughout Asia, ranging from over 25% of rural 
households in Indonesia (undoubtedly higher in Java) to 
38% in Bangladesh (ADB  1977). If Collier et al. (1977) 
are correct concerning the ease of labor movement into 
fishing, and there is little reason to conclude otherwise, 
there are two important implications for traditional fish- 
eries  development  programs.  First,  the  added  fishing 
effort resulting from these additional fishermen will only 
hasten the depletion of resources upon which traditional 
fishermen  depend, thus making  even more urgent the 
need to design appropriate programs that reduce fishing 
effort. Second, if employment opportunities are declin- 
ing in rural agriculture, and marginal labor is moving into 
f~hing,  it does not bode well for programs that expect 
surplus fishing  labor to be  absorbed by  other present 
rural activities. 
Conflicts between traditionaland indusnwl  fishermen: 
Conflicts  between  industrial  trawlers  and  traditional 
fishermen are increasingly frequent occurrences through- 
out  the  Southeast  Asian  region  and  provide  further 
evidence of  the problems created by  modernization of 
fishing fleets and  their exploitation of a limited 'open- 
access'  resource  base.  The  potential  areas  of  conflict 
have been identified by Robinson (1976) and by Lawson 
(1972, 1975) as (1) conflict over the resource base; (2) 
competition within factor (input) markets; and (3) com- 
petition in the marketing of the product. 
Intra-country conflicts over  the  resource  base  have 
been  widely reported in newspapers throughout South- 
east  Asia.  In  several  instances  these  have  resulted  in 
violence and even deaths (see Malaysian National Delega- 
tion report in Tiews  1976). Despite legislation in many 
countries  that  prohibits  operation  of  trawlers within 
certain  distances  from  the  shoreline,  it  has  proven 
extremely difficult to  enforce.  The  result  has  been a 
steady  encroachment  by  trawlers  on  the  resources 
previously exploited solely by traditional fishermen. The 
nets  and  gear  of  traditional  fishermen have  been  des- 
troyed as  commercial trawlers made theit passes along 
the coast  during the night. Additionally, since many of 
these  trawl  fisheries are  after  shrimps with their high 
export value,  the catch byproducts (i.e., trash fish) are 
often dumped  at  sea rather than marketed (Collier  et 
al.  1977).  As  an indication of the seriousness of these 
conflicts,  the  Malaysian  National  Delegation  to  the 
International Seminar on Fisheries Resources and Their 
Management  in  Southeast Asia  (Tiews  1976, p.  453) 
reported "a  total of one hundred incidents. . .  occurred 
between  the  traditional  inshore  fishermen  and  the 
trawler  fishermen  from  1970-1973."  The  severity  of 
such conflicts can be  gauged  from the facts that  1200 
boats were involved (about 400 trawlers and 800 inshore 
fishing boats), over 60 boats were sunk and 23 fishermen 
were  killed.  While  most  of  these conflicts occurred in 
Perak, Malaysia is certainly not alone in having experi- 
enced such violence. Similar conflicts have occurred in 
Indonesia (Collier  et  al.  1977) and  in  the  Leyte and 
Samar areas in the Philippines. 
Competition between  the two sectors in the factor 
(input) and product (output) markets is less obvious, but 
probably has an equally severe long-term effect on tradi- tional  fishermen.  Economic theory predicts that com- 
petitive conditions will guide factors of production (i.e., 
labor and capital) to those activities where their marginal 
return is the greatest, and will lead to capital-labor ratios 
that reflect the contribution to output, in value terms, 
of these factors of production. Traditional fisheries and 
industrial fisheries appear to operate, however, in  two 
separate labor  and  capital markets  where  competitive 
forces  between  them are constrained and thus do not 
bring  about such an equilibrium. In traditional fishing 
communities where the usual source of capital is private 
moneylenders, rates of interest, which reflect the price 
or cost of capital, may be as high as  10%/mo for short- 
term loans where  risks are high  and investment capital 
is  in short supply (Smith  1978). In  contrast, develop- 
ment  loans  available to industrial fisheries have  been 
highly subsidized, both by international lending agencies 
such  as  the  world  Bank  and  the  Asian  Development 
Bank  and by  domestic development banks through the 
establishment of lower interest rates in the 10-15%  range. 
This bias toward the industrial fisheries and the encourage- 
ment of capital usage in a capital-scarce  situation,  coupled 
with the 'open-access'  aspects of the resources, has en- 
couraged overcapitalization of the industrial fisheries at 
the expense of the traditional fishery. Moreover, the in- 
dustrial fishery is more capital intensive than would have 
been the case had interest rates been higher and thus re- 
flected the true sh.ortage  of capital. 
Competition in the product market may also work to 
the  disadvantage  of  traditional  fisheries.  As  stated by 
Lawson (1975, p. 8,9): 
"  , . .  as  [indusm'al]  fisheries  expand,  the standard 
of  living of  the [traditional]  fishermen relatively declines. 
This  arises  because  if  both the [industrial] and  [tradi- 
tional] fisheries are  simultaneously landing fish for the 
same market, the cost of fish landed will be lower from 
the  modem  vessels,  which  are  producing, on  a large 
scale, than from the small-scale [traditional] fishery. If 
market  prices  are  determined competitively then they 
will  eventually fall to near  the costs of production of 
the modern [industrial] sector (depending on the degree 
of  competition  between  vessel  owners  and  traders), 
which  will  cause  the  [traditional]  fishermen  to have 
even lower incomes than previously. 
Furthermore,  fish  traders will  become  increasingly 
reluctant  to incur  the higher collection costs involved 
in  procuring  relatively  smaller fish supplies from scat- 
tered and  distant [traditional] fishermen than from the 
large vessels which land bulk quantities of fish at access- 
ible centralized points. Indeed, few [traditional] fishery 
industries in  other countries in  the world  are  able to 
stand  up,  for long,  to  the  competition of  large-scale 
lowercost  producers  unless  they  themselves  are  able 
to get considerable government support." 
Of course, as claimed by Robinson (1976), there may 
be  advantages accruing  to the  traditional sector from 
development of the industrial sector. Infrastructure im- 
provement and the opening of new markets would be of 
mutual benefit, and it is not always the case that the two 
sectors are  catching the  same  species, nor  necessarily 
supplying  the  same  markets.  However,  of  more  than 
passing  interest, especially  to researchers, is  the  con- 
tention  that  laissez-faire  economic  policies  of  many 
governments  in  the  Southeast  Asian  region,  coupled 
with close links between  government and the business 
community, result in continued expansion of the indus- 
trial fishery at the expense of the traditional fishermen 
(Gibbons, pers. comm.). 
In summary, the empirical problems of surplus man- 
power  and conflicts between the traditional and indus- 
trial  fishing  sectors  appear  to have  their  roots in the 
finiteness and 'open-access'  nature of the resources that 
both sectors exploit. Because of this resource finiteness, 
despite a few  remaining underexploited areas, one can 
expect  these  problems  to  worsen in the future unless 
steps are taken through management schemes to reduce 
areas of  friction, and  through  rural development pro- 
grams to develop alternative income sources for 'surplus' 
fishermen. 
2. Inadequate Vessels and Gear 
The  majority of  fishermen do not  own vessels and 
many do not own fishing gear, but rather work as share 
or wage laborers on other vessels. Some are able to bor- 
row or rent vessels. The productivity of fishermen who 
must depend either on others to take them out or upon 
primitive gear such as makeshift spear guns, single hook- 
and-line, or pots that can be operated without a vessel is 
bound  to be low. The inadequacy of vessels and gear is 
certainly  a major  contributing factor to the low pro- 
ductivity  of  the individual fisherman. Because they see 
their boatowner  companions with higher catches, most 
hope to have vessels and gear of their own at some point 
in  the  future, thus  creating pressure  for development 
programs with a technological bias. 
However,  because  this  factor  is  a  problem  of  the 
individual, its solution conflicts with problems of tradi- 
tional fishermen as  a whole. As has been already hinted, 
and as will be developed further in a later section, what 
appears  as  a solution  for  the  individual  fisherman  in 
terms of upgraded vessel and gear may paradoxically im- 
pede a solution for the fisheries as a whole. 
The  Southeast Asian  Fisheries Development Center 
has  recently  compiled  regional  statistics that  help us Table 6. Number of vessels and fshermen in Southeast Asia in 1975-76.  Number of fishing craft by type and tonnage from SEAFDEC 
(1978). Number of fishermen from Table 3, present paper. 
Number of f&g  craft by type and tonnage 
Inboard powered boat  Ratio of 
Non-  Outboard  Less  More  Number  fishermen to 
powered  powered  than  than  of  fishing 
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Vietnam  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  317,400 
Totals  627,514  372,507  23,662  231,345  201,209  25,069 
(59.4%)  (3.8%)  (36.9%) 
Figures in italics are subtotals by country. 
n.a.:  not available 
a~he  classification of boats by tonnage for Peninsular Malaysia as shown in parentheses refer to long tons. 
view  the problems of inadequate vessels and gear from 
the perspective of the traditional fisherman (SEAFDEC 
1978) (Table  6).  SEAFDEC's  compilation of  statistics 
shows 627,514 fishing craft in the region, approximately 
60% of  which  are  nonmotorized, but  this  percentage 
is biased due to the skewed distribution in one country 
of  the  region.  With  the exception of  Indonesia which 
reports  94% of  its  fishing  craft  as  nonmotorized,  all 
other countries report that the majority of their fishing 
vessels are powered either by outboards or by inboards. 
However, over  95% of  these fishing craft displace less 
than 5 t, meaning that the vast majority of fishing craft 
belong to traditional fishermen. To obtain a rough indi- 
cation of  the extent of motorization in the traditional 
fishing  fleet, one can discount those vessels  which  are 
over  5 t, finding that 62% of the fishing craft are non- 
motorized (97% in Indonesia). 
Using  estimations of  numbers of fishermen in  each 
country (from  Table 3), one can then calculate a ratio 
of  fishermen to fishing craft which  ranges  from 2.3:l 
(Philippines)  to 8.2:l  (Singapore). A high ratio of fish- 
ermen to fishing craft could result from two factors. On 
the one hand, as  in Hong Kong (8.2: I), it reflects the 
industrialization of the fishing fleet with high labor re- quirements per vessel. On the other hand, as in Indonesia 
(4.2:1),  it reflects the large numbers of traditional fish- 
ermen with no fishing craft at all. It is difficult to  sepa- 
rate the effects of these two factors, but this is not terribly 
important as the purpose in presenting these ratios is not 
to provide  precise estimates, but rather to understand 
the  pressures  that  originate from  within  fishing com- 
munities  for  provision  of  and  motorization  of fishing 
craft. These pressures are due to the fact that fishermen 
with  no vessel, or with  an unmotorized one, often see 
upgrading as the solution to their personal problem of 
low standard of living. 
While  this  argument borders  on  the  obvious, it  is 
helpful in understanding the fisherman's  point of view. 
Some catch and income figures collected during a recent 
survey  in  the  Philippines (Herrin  et al.  1978) demon- 
strate the inequalities that can exist in small communities 
due  in  major  part  to the differences in  fishing vessels 
available to fishermen. As shown in Table 7, in the small 
town  of Libertad, Misamis Oriental in Mindanao, there 
are significant differences, first between  catch rates of 
owners/borrowers of motorized vessel on the one hand, 
and  owners of nonmotorized vessels on the other; and 
second, between incomes of vessel  owners and those of 
nonowners (both borrowers and laborers). What is inter- 
esting from these figures as pointed out by Herrin, et al. 
(1978) is that use of a motorized vessel, while it signifi- 
cantly  increases catch,  does not  significantly increase 
income. A borrower of a vessel in Libertad pays up to 
50% share of his catch to the owner of the vessel. Owner- 
ship  of  a  vessel,  however,  even  if  of a nonmotorized 
craft,  does  increase  net  income.  It is certainly under- 
standable, therefore,  that traditional fishermen with no 
vessel see ownership as the solution to their low standard 
of living. Indeed, slightly over 60% of the respondents in 
Herrin's  sample cited lack of fishing vessels and gear as 
their major problem. Recent increases in fuel prices may 
somewhat reduce these inequities, particularly if diesel 
fuel rationing becomes necessary or if whole communities 
cannot obtain fuel. The pressures for motorization and 
ownership will remain, however. 
3. Lack of Market Power 
The preceding sections imply that because catches are 
low,  income is  also  low.  Certainly  productivity has a 
major bearing on fishermen's  earning power, but other 
factors are also involved. A second potential contributing 
factor  to low incomes, besides low catch, is the price 
received  from sale of the catch. It is commonly alleged 
that fishermen have little, if any, control over marketing 
outlets or over the prices that they receive. Low incomes, 
and seasonal fluctuations in addition, create a situation 
of potential dependence that influences both choices of 
credit sources and marketing decisions by the traditional 
fishermen. Similar to the farmer who must subsist from 
planting to harvest with no source of income, so, too, 
must  the  fisherman  face  extended  periods  of  limited 
income. 
To overcome this, the choice in both cases has been 
to rely on private  sources for loans to tide the family 
over until income is restored. In the case of fishermen, 
the lending source, if not family or friend, is either the 
middleman  or  boatowners.  When  the  middleman  is 
chosen as  the  credit source, the marketing decision is 
preordained. 
The full role of middlemen is only recently becoming 
understood.  Middlemen  who  fulfill  multiple  roles  of 
marketing, merchandising, and moneylending are assumed 
to commonly exist in  rural  areas (Abbott  1959; Aziz 
1960; Sabri  1977). Wharton (1962)  calls such rniddle- 
men triple-threat monopsonists. However, he points out 
that the double-threat dealer (marketer moneylender) is 
Table 7. Catch and income by type of vessel ownership (Libertad, Philippines). Data are from Herrin et al. (1978). 
Annual catch (tons)  Annual household income (in pesos)a 
Owners of  Borrowers of  Owners of  Owners of  Borrowers of  Owners of 
motorized  motorized  nonmotorized  motorized  motorized  nonmotorized 
Location  vessels  vessels  vessels  vessels  vessels  vessels  Laborers 
Barrios Gimaylan and  2.59  2.6 1  .99  5,956  3,304  4,954  3,006 
Dulong, Libertad, 
Misamis Oriental 
Poblacion, Libertad,  2.87  2.53  n/ab  6,478  2,518  n/ab  2,143 
Misamis Oriental 
a~et  of fishing operating costs and depreciation on vessel, motor, and gear. 
b~here  were no nonmotorized vessels in the Poblacion sample. probably  much  more  common.  Although  the  issue  The underlying question remains, however. Do middle- 
retains its emotional nature, it has now become recog-  men  exploit fishermen? Because of the monopsony or 
nized  that  in  addition  to disadvantages,  middlemen  oligopsony  position  (single  buyer  or few buyers) that 
also provide services that are advantageous to fishermen  many  middlemen  enjoy, are  they able  to manipulate 
and that the fishermen's  market  risks  are reduced as a  prices  to their advantage, at the expense of the fisher- 
result.  men? If  so, what  form of marketing institution should 
In  a preliminary survey conducted in a Thai fishing 
village  in 1974, Ondam (1977) found that only 28% of 
the fishing families were in debt. One might be tempted 
to conclude  from this  information that  the financing 
role of middlemen is not too high. In contrast Lawson 
(1972) cites an example in Madras where 90%  of fishing 
families  were  in debt and where  the average debt was 
equivalent  to a 4-mo income. Fewer than 40% of  the 
loans,  however,  were  for  fishery  related  purposes. 
Undoubtedly there is also seasonal variation to indebted- 
ness levels. Because loans or gifts are often provided by 
middlemen to  fishermen for nonfishew ~umoses,  middle-  -- -  - 
men  play  a very  important role  in maintaining fishing 
households  in  times  of  poorfihing.  In  Malaysia  in- 
debtedness among fishermen seems to be high, and ties 
of  obligation  to  the  "towkays"  strong (Firth  1966). 
Permanency of the buyers has much to do with this. In 
the Philippines, for example, patron-client ties bptween 
those part-time fishermen who  gather milkfish fry and 
their buyerconcessionaires were found to be quite weak 
due to the frequent turnover of concessionaires (Smith 
1978).  "Suki"  buying  marine  catch  from  fishermen, 
however,  often  live  in  the  same  community  as  the 
fishermen, so  relationships between fishermen's  wives, 
who  do much of  the selling in the Philippines, and the 
middlemen are likely to be stronger. 
Part of the difficulty in measuring the true extent of 
dependence on  middlemen  comes from a tendency to 
look  at  fishermen's  indebtedness  in  only  monetary 
terms. Dependency results from more than just  formal, 
though  private,  indebtedness.  Gifts  from  boatowners 
or  middlemen in times of need are probably not con- 
sidered  debts per  se, but reflect  strong ties of  mutual 
obligation,  and  thus  dependency.  In  the  Philippines 
fishermen  have  obligations  of  sale  of  catch  to their 
"suki"  who will  often pay  medical bills or school fees 
or  help  with  the  fisherman's  subsistence in  times  of 
need  (Librero  et  al.  1976; Jocano and  Veloro  1976). 
fhe  extent  of  the  monetary  value  of  these  benefits 
has never been  fully measured, however, and it is pos- 
sible  that beliefs in their high levels are overstated, at 
least in the Philippines. 
Certainly there is variation in the role of middlemen 
from country to country, and variation in the degree 
of dependence of fishermen as  a result. In most cases, 
however, the ties serve to provide security to the fisher- 
men and a guaranteed source of supply to  the middlemen. 
replace or compete with them? 
To answer these questions. one must examine fisher- 
man-middleman ties on a case-by-case basis, as sweeping 
generalizations of  rapacious middlemen  serve  only  to 
obscure the facts and  to postpone in-depth analysis of 
the  relationship.  Moreover  such  generalizations  lead 
governments to too easily believe that state control will 
be more efficient and more beneficial for producers. So 
that the potential problem is made clear, it is possible at 
this stage to provide some of the theoretical underpinnings 
of the monopsony position through the use of  a simple 
economic model. 
As Wharton (1962, p. 4-5) pointed out, one must dis- 
tinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions to 
prove the existence of an exploitive monopsonist: 
"As  long as the monopsonist or oligopsony can main- 
tain  exclusive power  as  sole buyer  and  as long as  the 
commodity,  service,  or  factor  exhibits  marked  price 
inelasticity  of  supply,  there  are  sizeable  monopsony 
gains to be  reaped,. . .  The greater the price inelasticity 
of  supply  (which  in fact is the elasticity of  the firm's 
average factor cost schedule) the greater the gap between 
the  factor's  marginal  value  product  and  the  factor's 
average factor cost when marginal factor cost is equated 
with marginal value product." 
Price elasticity of supply is a measure of the respon- 
siveness  of  supply to changes in price.  Assume  a  10% 
increase in price.  If  the change in quantity supplied is 
more  than  lo%, supply  is  considered  elastic;  if  the 
change in quantity supplied is less thab lo%, supply is 
inelastic. For example referring to Figure 2, the portion 
of  the supply curve (S)  that is below but close to the 
MSY  point  is  more  inelastic than that portion of  the 
same supply curve in the lower lefthand comer of the 
graph. 
Figure 2 depicts the monopsonist facing a perfectly 
competitive market  for his product. The demand curve 
(D), that he faces is horizontal because it is assumed that 
he has little, if any, influence over the price at which he 
will sell his fish. D is also his average value product (AVP) 
curve  and  marginal  value  product (MVP)  curve. While 
undoubtedly more realistic, assuming an imperfect sellers 
market  in which  the monopsonist does have some con- 
trol over his selling price and hence a downward sloping 
demand curve does not alter this basic  analysis of the 
monopsony  position.  The  monopsonist  faces  a  fish 
supply (S) curve that is, on the one hand, assumed to  be D=  AVP= MVP 
QUANTITY 
gig.  2.  Theoretical  model  of  monopsonist  in  factor  market 
facing  perfect  competition  in  product  market:  the  fishery 
case. 
upward sloping (implying that fishermen will intensify 
their  efforts  and thus attempt to supply more fish to 
take advantage of higher prices) and on the other hand, 
that is also equal to the average factor cost (AFC) curve. 
The  model  is  derived  from  the  'traditional'  model 
(Gordon  1954; Christy  and  Scott  1965),  except  that 
price  is  a  proxy  for  numbers  of  fishermen or fishing 
effort. This particular model assumes that the fishery is 
operating in that portion of the long-run supply curve 
that slopes upward to the right, that is, below the point 
of maximum sustainable yield  (MSY).  At  catch levels 
above  MSY,  the  supply curve would bend backwards, 
implying that the higher prices, while inducing increased 
effort, yield a lower catch because of the biological limits 
of the resource (Copes  1970 and Appendix). 
The supply curve indicates cost per unit as a function 
of output and shows the quantities of fish that would be 
offered for sale by fishermen at each price level, or alter- 
natively, the  amount of  fish that can be purchased by 
the middleman monopsonist at each price level. A mar- 
ginal factor cost (MFC)  curve which shows the added or 
marginal cost per unit increase in output is therefore also 
upward sloping, can be derived from the supply (AFC) 
curve.  Under  perfect  competition,  equilibrium would 
result at Point A, the intersection of supply and demand 
where  AFC  = AVP,  with  a  price  of  PC and quantity 
purchased of q.  This point A is analogous to the point 
where  total costs equal total revenue in the traditional 
fisheries model (Gordon  1954; Crutchfield and Zellner 
1962). The monopsonist, however, would equate MFC = 
MVP,  the  marginal  factor  cost  to the  marginal value 
product  rather  than  AFC  = AVP.  Purchases would be 
restricted to Q,,,  and alower price of Pm would be paid to 
suppliers.  The monopsonist would be  willing to pay a 
price as high  as PC to secure the desired quantity, s, 
but because he controls the price paid to fishermen, only 
needs  to  pay  a  price  of  Pm.  The  shaded  rectangle 
PmBPc would thus represent potential monopsorly gains. 
The model at hand can become quickly complex if it 
is extended to deal with downward-sloping and shifting 
demand curves and issues of fisheries management that 
arise  from  divergence  of  private  and  social  costs and 
revenues  (Copes  1972).  The  simpler  version  above  is 
offered only to demonstrate the necessary condition for 
monopsony gains, that is, inelasticity of supply. 
A  monopsony  position could be  created and main- 
tained by  any one or more of the following power fac- 
tors that would  provide suffkient conditions (Wharton 
1962): 
1. Legal  power  such  as  license  or  exclusive right. 
2. Illegal power such as force or threats. 
3. Economic power such as control of complementary 
inputs used by sellers, or through extension of credit or 
cash  advances to sellers, or control over transport,  or 
where  the volume of transaction is too low to support 
additional buyers. 
4. Technical or natural power that results from either 
physical  isolation or from declining average .costs  over 
the  relevant  range  of  quantity  produced.  (This is the 
counterpart of utilities on the monopoly side.) 
5. Cultural power which results from social structures 
and relationships that prevent transfer of business by the 
seller. 
6. Psychological power resulting from propagandizing 
or brainwashing that reinforce habitual behavior. 
7. Informational  or educational  power  that  results 
from poor knowledge of the price and sale alternatives 
on the part of sellers. 
In  traditional  fishing communities, combinations of 
3)  economic,  5)  cultural,  and 7) informational power 
factors  appear in varying degrees implying satisfaction 
of the sufficient conditions for the existence of monop- 
sony exploitation of fishermen by middlemen. However 
a major caveat is that costs of operation of the middleman 
must be  correctly identified before one concludes that 
these conditions warrant interference. For instance one 
may find net returns to  middlemen exceeding 3Wo.  Since 
this  includes returns  to management  skill and to risk, 
these factor costs must be specified before one can con- 
clude that 30% represents "too high"  a rate of return. A 
more balanced perspective can be obtained by comparing 
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Fishermanlmiddleman trading relationships are not in 
all  cases  static. Many factors will work to change them 
over time, including the following identified by Lawson 
(1972): 
1. Grouping and concentration of the presently high- 
ly dispersed traditional fisheries. 
2. Mobility of labor, capital, and entrepreneurial re- 
sources,  particularly  of  intermediaries  who  perform 
varied  and  multipurpose functions. Specialization can 
be expected as industry integration occurs. 
3. The  growing  capital requirements of  the  sector 
which  lead  to  involvement  of  investors  from  other 
nonfishery sectors. 
4. The level  of economic growth, increases in which 
may provide alternative employment to fishermen and 
improve  communications and  roads  to remote  areas. 
5. Institutional developments including fish market- 
ing organizations, cooperative societies, state of fishing 
corporations, numerous types of loan schemes to fisher- 
men and boatowners, and provision of improved market 
information services. 
The dynamic nature of the relationships presents par- 
ticular  challenges  for  research  which  could  helpfully 
document  these  changes  and  examine  the reasons for 
and  the  potential  for  flexibility  in  the  fisherman/ 
middleman ties. 
To further understand the economic function of the 
middleman, it is helpful to distinguish between technical 
and price efficiency in the distribution of catch. "Market- 
ing efficiency  is  usually subdivided into two different 
categories-operational  (technological)  efficiency  and 
pricing  (economic)  efficiency.  Operational  efficiency 
assumes the  essential nature  of  outputs of goods and 
services remains unchanged and focuses on reducing the 
costs  of  inputs  doing the job.. .Pricing  efficiency  is 
concerned with improving the operation of the buying, 
selling, and pricing aspects of the marketing process so 
that it will remain responsive to consumer direction .  . . 
Pricing efficiency, then, is a result of the nature of com- 
petition  and  balance  of  economic  power  that  exists 
within  the  marketing  process."  (Kohls  1972, p.  11). 
Studies on the pricing efficiency of fish marketing sys- 
tems are few and far between. 
Instances where middlemen are able to achieve some 
degree of monopsony power and thus large profit margins 
are examples of price inefficiencies in distribution. That 
is, market forces are unable to bring the price differen- 
tials between producers'  price received and consumers' 
price paid into line with the cost of the services provided 
by middlemen. 
Technical  inefficiencies,  on  the  other hand, result 
primarily from waste in the distribution system. It has 
been  estimated that up to 40% of catch of fishermen 
never  reaches the consumer due to spoilage caused by 
bacteria, fungi, and enzymes resulting from poor handling 
practices (Craib andKetler 1978). Waste in the traditional 
fisheries sector in the tropics is caused primarily by a 
lack  of  chilling facilities, which, although perhaps not 
seen  as  such  from  the  perspective  of  the  traditional 
fisherman,  is  one  of  the  major  problems  facing the 
sector. Reduction in waste, and hence improvements in 
quality, offers one potential way  to increase  the price 
that the fisherman receives for his catch. 
The  necessity  for objectively evaluating all  benefits 
derived  by  fishermen  from  the  middlemen has been 
stressed in recent literature, mainly to explain the failure 
of cooperative and credit programs that sought to obviate 
the  dependency  on  middlemen  (FA0  1975; Lawson 
1972, 1977; Emmerson 1978; Elliston  1976). The same 
cautionary flag  could be raised with regard to state-run 
marketing organizations and their likely impact. As ob- 
se~ed  by Lawson (1975), traditional fishermen are pre- 
occupied with survival. Despite their theoretical appeal, 
cooperatives have  generally been unable to provide the 
security that the fisherman receives from a flexible and 
mutually  beneficial  tie  with  his  financierlmarketer. 
Although  details  of  this  arrangement are available for 
Sri  Lanka  (Alexander  1975)  and  for  Malaysia  (Firth 
1966), very little is known for the Southeast Asian and 
Southwest Pacific regions as a whole. 
While  the above discussion may  sound equivocating 
as far as the problem of exploitation is concerned, the 
point  remains  that  though perhaps not exploited, tra- 
ditional  fishermen  are  poor; middlemen, on the other 
hand,  generally  are  not.  Researchers, and  economists 
in  particular, must  be  careful not to be  apologists for 
the  status quo.  Again,  bearing in  mind  that  this is a 
discussion of problems from the perspective of the tra- 
ditional fishermen, the lack  of market power and free- 
dom  of  choice  inherent in dependence on middlemen 
and  the  income  inequalities that  result  between  pro- 
ducers and those that distribute the catch argue for the 
development of ways to increase the return received by 
producers.  Integration  by  fishermen  forward  in  the 
marketing chain, once they have  the  requisite skills to 
handle their own books and business arrangements, may 
be one of these. This assumes, of course, that economies 
of scale can be  achieved by fishermen's  groups as they 
are presently achieved by middlemen. 
4. Inflation 
The  factors contributing to low standards of living 
that have-so far been  discussed center on the fisheries 
production  or  distribution sectors. There is one other important  factor  that  should  be  mentioned  briefly 
before  moving  on  to a  discussion  of  solutions to the 
problems  raised.  This factor is inflation, which  affects 
rural communities as a whole and not only fishermen. 
The Asian  Development Bank (1978) has calculated 
that  there has  been  a general decline in real wages  in 
Southeast  Asia  within  the  past  decade,  due  in  great 
measure  to the rapid inflation during 1972-1  974. While 
measuring effects of this inflation on traditional fishing 
communities  would  entail  considerable  research  and 
collection of data not presently available, the following 
few  paragraphs  are  offered  as  a probable scenario for 
what has occurred within the past decade. 
Data from the Philippines will be presented as sugges- 
tive of the situation in Southeast Asian region as a whole. 
Using price indices available through the Central Bank of 
the Philippines, it is possible to show the changes in retail 
prices for selected items since 1970. Referring to Figure 
3, the price  changes for the  following commodities or 
composite  groups  are  shown:  food,  clothing,  fuel, 
fish, and  all items. Price indices for food, clothing, and 
all items are  for all income households in areas outside 
Metro Manila.  These indices reflect prices in the major 
urban market areas in the 12 regions of the Philippines. 
Indices  for  fuel  and  fish  are  for Metro Manila  retail 
prices. Although the increases for these items have been 
roughly comparable since 1972, fish price increases have 
been somewhat lower than increases in prices of clothing 
and fuel. 
What  are the implications of  these rates of increase 
for  the  traditional  fishermen  in  the Philippines?  One 
must bear  in  mind  that only a small  fraction of these 
fishermen  are  in  the  Manila  area  for which  fuel  and 
fish price data are available. Their catch, if it is widely 
distributed at  all,  has  to be  transported to the major 
markets  including  Manila.  Consumer  goods,  including 
food and clothing, and fishing inputs such as fuel must 
on the whole be distributed from major market centers 
to the more isolated fishing communities. What this im- 
plies  is  that  the  price  the  fisherman  receives  for  his 
catch has probably not risen  as  fast as  the Manila fish 
retail price index, and that the rural price index for fuel 
and other consumer goods which he must buy has prob- 
ably risen  faster than those for Manila and other major 
market  centers  outside  Manila.  Fishermen  would  be 
particularly  susceptible to fuel price increases. In eco- 
nomic  terms,  the  terms  of  trade  for  fish  may  have 
worsened.  The  result, not proveable without consider- 
ably more information of course, is that in all likelihood 
in the rural areas the rise in price of fish has not kept up 
with the rise  in prices of fuel, food, and clothing, thus 
combining with  lower catches to make  the traditional 
fisherman worse off now than a decade ago. The fact that 
only  20%  of  the traditional  fishermen inte~ewed  in 
recent  surveys  in  the  Philippines  believe  their  living 
conditions have improved in the past 5 yr would tend to 
confirm the above observations. 
It is possible that in the future the terms of trade for 
fish may  improve  as  natural limits to the expansion of 
wild stocks are reached and as demand increases due to 
population growth. As will be shown in a later discussion, 
demand  increases  can  contribute to overfishing, so in 
reality  it is the  factors of  price increases and  reduced 





Fig.  3.  Consumer  prices for  fish, fuel, food, and 
clothing (Philippines) 1970-1978. 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.  150 - 
l~hrou~h  October 1978.   or fuel and fish, index  is for Metropolitan Ma- 
nila retail prices.  100 - 
3~or  food, clothing, and all  items, 1972-1978, in- 
dex is consumer price index for all income house-  - 
holds in  areas outside Metro  Manila.  For  1970- 
197 1, index is Metropolitan Manila price index of 
the  respective  commodity  chiefly  of  domestic  I  .I 
origin  (not  using  imported  inputs)  which  is 
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thought  to be  more representative of consumer 
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goods available in rural areas.  (1972  = 100) SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS 
The  foregoing  discuaion  has  developed  a view  of 
factors  contributing  to low  standards  of  living  from 
the  perspective  of  fishermen  themselves.  As  such  it 
has  concentrated  on  low  productivity,  inadequate 
vessels  and  gear,  lack  of  alternative  income  sources, 
lack  of  market  power,  and  inflation. These  concrete 
day-today  concerns  of  traditional  fishermen  have 
been  classified  as  empirical problems.  While  the  first 
two  are  related  directly to the  'open-access'  resources 
traditional  fishermen  exploit,  the last  three  are prob- 
lems characteristic of the rural sector as a whole, rather 
than confined to the fisheries sector per se. The market- 
ing  and  distribution of  fishery products in  the tropics 
present particular  problems  due to the extreme perish- 
ability of  the product that  distinguishes it from other 
major  rural  marketing systems that deal with storable 
commodities. Aside  from occasional processing through 
drying, salting, smoking or fish paste or sauce fermenta- 
tion, the traditional fisherman, or more  accurately the 
female members of his family, are unlikely to be involved 
in  marketing  catch  other than their  own.  Except for 
spoilage  that occurs before first sale, the later wastage 
occurring in  the distribution of  the catch to the final 
consumers is  beyond  the control of fishermen and not 
viewed  as  an empirical problem of traditional fishermen 
per se. However, reduction in waste, particularly through 
proper use  of ice and/or freezing facilities, may  be  an 
avenue  for  increasing the price  received by  traditional 
fishermen for their catch, or alternatively may present 
opportunities  for  intermediate  processing  technology 
that permits the fnhermen to take over some of those 
functions previously performed by middlemen and thus 
vertically  integrating the  fisherman  in  the  marketing 
chain. 
Because  the  resource  is  limited and  therefore can 
support only a limited number of fishermen, the search 
for  solutions to the  empirical problems  of  traditional 
fishermen must take an holistic approach that considers 
a  resource/fisherman/distribution continuum  existing 
within the context of a larger rural sector with attendant 
social, political, and  economic institutions.  Implied is 
the necessity for viewing the fish production sector, on 
the one hand, as vertically integrated with factor (input) 
markets  and  with  product  markets, and on the other 
hand, as  horizontally integrated with other nonfishing 
sectors and institutions within the rural area. 
While retaining a clear view of the empirical problems 
of  traditional  fishermen, it is possible to broaden the 
perspective  of  the sector as a whole by discussing first, 
the  attempts  in  the  past  two  decades  to solve  these 
empirical problems; second, a theoretical framework for 
predicting  the likely effects of  development  programs; 
and third, the suppositional problems that have been un- 
covered in the process. Suppositional problems, it will 
be recalled, are related to the often inflexible, tacit, and 
unwarranted assumptions that are made by those seeking 
solutions to empirical problems.  They  include on the 
one hand, assumptions about traditional fishermen and 
their  behavior, particularly in regard  to their homoge- 
neity, irrationality, and  immobility, and on the other 
hand, assumptions regarding resource availability and the 
likely effects of development projects and programs. A 
broadening of  these perspectives is  the purpose of  the 
following section. 
Solutions to Low  Standards of Living 
of Traditional Fishermen 
THE ALTERNATIVES 
It  is  apparent  that  solutions  to  these  extremely 
complex  problems  of  traditional  fishermen  will  not 
be  easily  defined  and  applied.  Indeed, the  history of 
past  development efforts has  been  one  of  frustration 
and  failure, with  only  limited successes.  Early in this 
paper, a schematic was presented (Figure 1) that showed 
the  major  empirical  factors  contributing to the  low 
standard  of  living  of  traditional  fishermen.  The  low 
living  standard has been  defined  primarily,  if  not ex- 
clusively,  in  terms  of  household  income.  The  lower 
half  of  that  same  figure  indicates hypothetical  ways 
in which income can be raised. On  the one hand, fishery- 
centered solutions can be sought that (1) increase catch; 
(2)  increase  prices received  for the catch; or (3) lower 
the costs of fishing. On  the other hand, solutions can be 
sought outside the present traditional capture fisheries 
through (4)  creation of  alternative employment oppor- 
tunities in aquaculture or in other nonfish related activi- 
ties.  Such employment opportunities could be  for the 
fisherman himself or for other members of his household. 
To  achieve  these  specific  objectives, four  possible 
methods can be  considered for the sake of discussion: 
(1)  vessel  and  gear  upgrading; (2)  restricting effort or 
subsidizing the fishing industry; (3) improving marketing 
and  postharvest technology; and (4) rural development. 
One of the purposes of this section is to examine which 
of these, if any, has potential for alleviating fishing com- 
munity poverty. The purpose of upgrading vessels and gear would be 
primarily  to increase  the catch or productivity of the 
fishermen. To the extent that the new vessels and gear 
are  designed  to  tap  new,  more  valuable  stocks,  this 
method could also increase the price that the fisherman 
receives  for his  catch. There are major problems with 
vessel  and gear upgrading as shall be shown; results are 
often quite the opposite of what is intended. 
An  alternative method  to increase productivity is to 
restrict  fishing effort by  limiting the number of fisher- 
men; of course, this method eliminates income entirely 
for those fishermen who are displaced and is thus not 
socially  or  politically  acceptable  in  most,  if  not  all, 
Southeast  Asian  countries.  Limitations  on  entry  also 
involve  the  government  in  the  marketplace,  as would 
government  subsidies  to  the  industry  to either  raise 
prices received for catch or to lower the costs of fishing 
inputs.  Examples  of  such  subsidies  would  include 
subsidized fuel costs or even credit programs that make 
capital available  at less than  the market rate. It should 
also  be  pointed  out  that  management  prescriptions 
should  vary  depending on  the type of biological over- 
fishing  that  is  taking  place.  Growth  overfishing,  for 
example, may  require  enforcement of minimum mesh 
sizes, while recruitment  overfishing will  require a more 
direct  approach  to  reducing  fishing  effort,  such  as 
reductions in numbers of fishermen. 
Improvements in marketing and postharvest technol- 
ogy aimed at reducing price or technical inefficiencies in 
the  distribution  and  processing of traditional  fisheries 
catch would be aimed primarily at reduction in waste or 
at provision of marketing infrastructures, such as trans- 
port, ice and cold storage, or landing areas. The rationale 
for programs in this category is that increases in price 
and technical efficiency will  result in higher prices being 
received by the fishermen. 
Rural development is a multifaceted method of raising 
the standard of living in rural areas. It is much more than 
simply the provision of physical infrastructure, although 
this is an integral part, because it involves the develop- 
ment  or  adaptation  of  rural  institutions  to changing 
society. As such it covers among other activities the for- 
mation  of  cooperatives or other fishermen's  groupings 
that  are  designed  to raise  the  market  power  of their 
members to either increase prices received  or to lower 
costs.  It also  includes programs to develop alternative 
sources of income for rural households, thus raising the 
opportunity wage of fishermen.  Underlying many, though 
certainly  not  all,  rural  development  programs  is  an 
attempt to involve rural communities themselves in proj- 
ect  identification  and  thus  avoid  centralized planning 
from the top down. 
A review of the general direction of past development 
programs  will provide  a backdrop  against which these 
alternative methods can be evaluated. In the process the 
changing  view  of  constraints  to development will  be 
documented and some remaining suppositional problems 
identified. 
POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS TO DEVELOPMENT 
Potential constraints to raising the living standards of 
small-scale fishermen can be broadly grouped into three 
categories: biological, technological, and socioeconomic. 
Biological constraints are the obvious ones of stock limi- 
tations and the resultant overfishing that can occur. These 
have been long recognized as major potential constraints 
to fisheries development and no detailed discussion of 
the theory is necessary here. 
In a'theoretical  sense technological constraints would 
be based on the inability to design the improved gear, 
vessels, motors, or supporting infrastructure such as boat 
yards, roads, ice and cold storage facilities, or processing 
equipment that would be necessary to  develop the fishery. 
The more  important  aspect  for  traditional  fisheries is 
that  production  and processing technology may not be 
available in the appropriate form or scale. 
t 
Potential  socioeconomic constraints  involve  fisher- 
men themselves and those formal and informal institu- 
tions,  private  and  governmental, that  influence  pro- 
duction  and  distribution.  For example fishermen may 
be  reluctant  to adopt improved technology As  will be 
shown later, there may be perfectly rational reasons for 
this reluctance, but it is at least hypothetically possible 
that fishermen would be resistant to  change per se. Com- 
munity  social  and economic organizations can also be 
expected to resist disruptive change. Government exten- 
sion personnel could be overworked and underpaid, un- 
willing to serve in rural areas, or have close ties with the 
business  sector-all  factors which make it difficult for 
the  traditional  fishermen  to benefit  from government 
se~ces.  Credit  may  not  be  available  without  collat- 
eral, an almost impossible criterion for most traditional 
fishermen, or if available, may be unwisely administered. 
Market infrastructure  may not be developed enough to 
handle  increased  production.  Development  projects 
themselves may  hinder  further  attempts due  to unex- 
pected  social  costs.  Finally,  in  some  countries  (e.g., 
Pakistan)  market  demand  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
support  a  greatly expanded fishery without  successful 
efforts to change consumer tastes (B.  Lmkwood,.pers. 
comm.).  Underlying all three  areas is a general lack of 
data  which  can  be  used  for  intelligent planning  and 
policy formulation. 
Prior  to the  1970s it was widely believed  that the key to uplifting the living conditions of traditional fish- 
ermen in an expeditious way could be found in improved 
vessel  and  gear  technology.  Development projects  of 
the  1950s and  1960s reflected  this  emphasis through 
their concentration on more efficient techniques, almost 
to the exclusion of other, nontechnical, considerations 
(Sainsbury  1977). Failures of communities to adopt the 
techniques  made  available  were  attributed  to short- 
comings in the fishermen themselves. As difficulties with 
this approach grew,  despite some limited localized suc- 
cesses (e.g.,  outboard motors in Ghana), it became appar- 
ent  that  technological change  could not, to borrow a 
phrase from Alexander's (1975) study of Sri Lanka fish- 
eries, take place in a cultural vacuum. Neither, might one 
add, can it take place in a biological vacuum. 
The effects of modernization on numbers of fisher- 
men required can be  dramatic. Off  the north coast  of 
Java in  1974, "a  motorized boat using traditional gear 
and  employing  22  crew  members  caught  the  same 
amount of  fish as 41 sailboats employing 287 people" 
(Collier et al. 1977). 
In  fact,  the  emphasis  on  technology was  seriously 
questioned  as early as the mid-1960s (Hamlisch 1967, 
p.  33).  In a wide-ranging paper, Hamlisch attacked the 
thesis that the "biggest  obstacle (to increasing produc- 
tion) is human ignorance and slowness of dissemination 
of technical knowledge."  Some of his more salient points 
bear  repeating here.  Hamlisch  emphasized  the role  of 
market forces in spurring development of fisheries and 
cited Peru and South Africa as examples, both of which 
successfully  entered  the  expanding  fishmeal  market. 
Development  in other sectors of a country's  economy 
can also benefit  or adversely affect the fisheries sector, 
as  in  the  cases  of  the  Congo  and  Mauritania  when 
mining  activities  stimulated  fisheries  development  to 
meet  the new demand of workers, or as in the case of 
Oregon (U.S.)  when  the higher wages and more stable 
income derived from tourism attracted sufficient workers 
from the fishery so as to destroy the coastal fishery. The 
opportunity wage available from tourism meant that the 
fishery could no longer compete for labor. 
Harnlisch cites earlier attempts to classify factors in- 
fluencing  development  that  distinguished  betwca 
"natural"  and cchuman"  influences (Netherlands Econom- 
ic Institute 1958; Traung 1960; Morgan 1956). "Natural" 
influences would include those earlier classified as biol- 
ogical; "human"  would include technological and socio- 
economic  factors.  Since  "natural"  influences are  not 
dealt with in Hamlisch's  paper, the "human"  influences 
that he discussed at length are summarized in Table 8 
under the sociological, cultural, psychological, economic, 
and institutional headings that he identified. Sociological 
factors were  identified as those that influence produc- 
Table 8. "Human"  input factors influencing development of fish- 
eries, summarized from Hamlisch (1967). 
A.  Sociological factors influencing production 
1. Availability of labor 
2.  Future recruitment prospects 
3.  Attitude toward work 
4.  Labor productivity 
5. Social discrimination: Inferiority of fishing and fishermen 
B.  Cultural and Psychological factors influencing producer atti- 
tudes 
1.  Goal direction and reaction to stimuli 
2.  Desire for material possessions and economic independence 
3.  Fatalism 
4.  Reluctance to make long-term investments or accumulate 
capital 
5. Lack of deferred gratification 
6.  Religion and traditional authority 
7.  Working conditions 
a)  hard and fatiguing work 
b)  no regular hours of work 
C)  no family life 
d)  limited  opportunity  to  participate in community or 
political life 
e)  irregular and uncertain earnings 
f)  restricted mobility 
g) lack of safety 
8.  Basic consewatism 
9.  Fishing boat doubling as home of the family (e.g.,  Hong 
Kong) 
10. Prestige factors influencing vessel design 
11. Desire for quick turnover of investment 
C.  Economic considerations  influencing  entrepreneurial decisions 
1. Degree of control over prices of inputs and outputs 
2.  Vertical integration 
3.  Level of entrepreneurial skill; ability to adjust input ratios 
and assess markets 
4.  Costbenefit analysis, including capitalization of expected 
operating costs 
5. Availability of materials and facilities for manufacture of 
boats 
6. Import duties on new technology:  ensnes and gear 
7.  Fuel costs 
8. Bank and private market interest rates 
9.  Financing opportunities 
10. Risk 
D.  Institutional factors 
1.  Dependence upon middlemen (threefold role of supplier/ 
marketerlfinancer) 
2.  Middlemen's  attitudes toward risk and financing for long- 
term development 
3.  Share-catch vs.  hourly wage:  effects on incentives 
4.  Cooperative possibilities 
a)  roots of cooperative endeavor 
b)  lack of apparent immediate economic benefits 
C)  aids channeling of investment 
5. Role of government:  direct legislative intervention 
encourage private initiative 
discourage private initiative tion; cultural and psychological  factors as those which 
influence producer  attitudes;  and  economic factors as 
those  which  influence entrepreneurial or management 
decisions. Underlying these factors are institutional con- 
siderations which  include  the  producers'  relationship 
with  middlemen,  the  method  of  sharing  the  catch 
value,  middlemen's  economic  considerations, and  the 
role  of  formal  institutions  such  as  cooperatives  and 
government. 
While  one might argue over how Hamlisch chose to 
categorize certain factors (e.g.,  is 'attitude toward work' 
a social or psychological influence?), I do not propose to 
discuss each of these categories in detail beyond making 
a necessary  comment regarding the elements identified 
by  Hamlisch  under  cultural  factors. Several  of  these 
points, particularly those of fatalism and lack of deferred 
gratification, are common observations made by others 
at roughly the same time, notably Rogers (1969), regard- 
ing the characteristics of peasantry subculture in general. 
Rogers'  work became  most  controversial (as  did Ham- 
lisch's  though  for  different reasons)  and his assertions 
have since been widely disputed by those citing farmers' 
willingness  to  adopt  new  technologies  (e.g.,  Castillo 
1975). The important point for the moment is not the 
disagreement itself which  will be  commented on later, 
but  rather the inclusion of attitudes of producers and 
middlemen into the mix of potential constraints. Appre- 
ciation of these attitudes is crucial to an understanding 
of the problems and potential of fisheries development. 
A second point raised by Hamlisch is also worth em- 
phasis.  Related  to the  role  of government in  fisheries 
he states: 
''While  government policies are seldom as well defined 
as to allow a clear identification of. . .  aims, and while 
several aims may be  pursued simultaneously, an indus- 
try may seriously delude itself if it expects public issues 
resolved solely in terms of its parochial interests . .  .  eco- 
nomic progress will lead to a transfer of resources from 
primary  industry  to other  sectors.  This  may  have  as 
consequences the  lowering of  total  fishing  income  as 
well  as  a  redistribution  of that income within the in- 
dustry, and  eventually the exit of marginal producers. 
Governments  may  decide  to  accelerate  rather  than 
retard  this  process,  while  simultaneously  trying  to 
alleviate the attendant hardship. 
Welfare  considerations make  it mandatory to bring 
policies for economic progress in line with capacity of 
other sectors to absorb marginal elements. The pleas of 
an industry that is destined to decline within the natural 
course of economic evolution, on the other hand, should 
not,  in the national interest, always be  answered with 
increased financial support" (p. 43). 
Hamlisch thus brought a broad social perspective to 
the  forefront, a perspective that appears to have  been 
ignored  in  more  recent years as huge sums have  been 
'invested'  in  projects  to increase  fishermen's  produc- 
tivity.  Governments  may  choose,  among  other alter- 
natives  for development of traditional fisheries, to en- 
courage marginal fishermen to depart from the fisheries 
and  engage  in  alternative income-generating activities. 
This  argument  was  later  repeated  by  Proude  (1973), 
among others, who argued that "in  cases where there is 
little  or  no prospect that  small-scale fisheries can  be 
developed to the point of competing effectively without 
requiring  protection  of  a  kind  that  seriously distorts 
factor allocation, adjustment policies must not seek to 
prevent  a  natural withering away"  (p. 2191).  The im- 
portance  of  this  point  will  be  more  readily  apparent 
after an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of 
change in the traditional fisheries sector. 
Alternative  activities may  be  in  midwater or deep- 
water commercial fisheries for a select few where under- 
exploited  or  untapped  resources might exist, in aqua- 
culture, or in nonfishery sectors entirely. The rationale 
for such alternatives derives from the conflict between 
goals of maximizing employment on the one hand and 
net economic returns on the other. As pointed out by 
Christy (1973),  once a fishery is fully utilized as most 
coastal fisheries are, increases in net revenue can result 
only from cost reductions, implying reduced numbers of 
fishermen. 
This should not be taken to imply encouragement to 
all small-scale fishermen to leave the fishery; such a sug- 
gestion would be  both naive and ludicrous. As pointed 
out by Cole and Anand (1975), even in countries with 
highly developed commercial fisheries such as Japan and 
some  European  countries,  the  majority  of  fishermen 
still operate from relatively small vessels catching fish of 
occasional  high  value  or  species  such  as  bivalves  not 
capable of being caught from larger vessels. In fact, there 
are examples where a highly capitalized fishery is revert- 
ing back to one with smaller boats, as in the case of the 
British Isles where large  freezer trawlers are being sold 
or scrapped in favor of relatively tiny bottom seiners and 
pair trawlers, with a corresponding increase in the total 
number of fishermen employed (D.  B.  Thomson, pers. 
comm.). 
The important  point  being  made,  however, is that 
ways have to be found to evaluate all development alter- 
natives, including those of reducing the numbers of fish- 
ermen  or  the  level  of  fishing  effort.  These  are  not 
necessarily  the same thing as it may be possible to en- 
courage full-time fishermen to become part-time fisher- 
men, thus reducing fishing effort but not the number of 
fishermen. 
It is helpful at this point to examine the theoretical basis for these concerns that reflect the underlying 'open- 
access' nature of the resource and the lack of restrictions 
on fishing effort. Christy and Scott (1965) used the 'tra- 
ditional  model'  to  show  the  effects  of  technological 
change  and of increased price on sustainable yield and 
on  revenue  curves (Figures 4  and  5).  The 'traditional' 
model can also be used to  demonstrate the effects of cost 
changes (Figure  6).  The Christy and Scott analysis was 
based on several restricting assumptions, namely: 
1. The fishery is already exploited at that point where 
total costs equal total revenue; that is, the resource is 
economically  overfished  (their  diagrams  also  tacitly 
assume biological overfishing); 
2. Changes in output have no effect on prices; 
3. Uniform operating costs and no fmed costs; 
4. No variation in length of fishing season; and 
5. Freedom of entry and exit. 
Because  an  increase  in  price received by  fishermen 
has  been  cited  as  one  means by  which  standards of 
living can be raised, we need to relax the second assump- 
tion,  while  retaining the other four. Therefore, rather 
than  using the 'traditional'  model, a theoretical model 
that allows for price changes is required. The resulting 
scenario  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  predicted  by 
Christy  and  Scott but  adds the  price  dimension  and 
thus makes elasticity of demand a crucial determinant 
of  the  resulting  changes in  total  revenue.  The  model 
which helps to analyze these changes is a variation on 
that  presented  in  Figure  2,  which  demonstrated  the 
monopsony  position,  and  represents  the  framework 
developed  by  Copes  (1970,  1972) in  his  analysis of 
factor  rents  and  resource management.  The effects of 
changes in technology, input cost, and  prices of  catch 
are shown in Figures 7 and 8, which can then be com- 
pared to those of the  'traditional'  model. For the sake 
of  the  present  argument,  it  will  be  assumed  that  the 
demand curve (D)  intercepts the supply curve (S) at a 
point  above  (beyond)  MSY.  For those interested, the 
Appendix which is taken from Copes (1970) shows the 
relationship  between  the  'traditional'  model  and  the 
model which includes the price dimension. 
Examining first the effects of a change in technology 
which we  will assume to be labor-saving to some degree, 
one finds a shift in the supply curve from S to s',  a re- 
duction  in quantity, and  an increase in price.  How do 
these  effects  come about? Referring first to Figure 4, 
and assuming that equilibrium has been reached where 
total costs equal total revenue, the introduction of the 
new  technology  will  first  increase  the level of  fishing 
effort so that total costs exceed total revenues, implying 
that the same quantity can be supplied with less effort. 
According to the 'traditional' model, marginal producers 
will  then be  driven out of the industry, the sustainable 
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Fig. 4. Effect of technological innovation on yield and revenue 
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Fig. 8. Effects of an  upward  shift in demand on quantity and 
price. 
yield  will  be  reduced,  and  total  revenue  will  decline. 
Regarding effects on employment, the 'traditional' model 
as developed by Christy and Scott must be interpreted 
with caution, because it measures number of fishermen 
rather  than  fishing  effort  along  the  horizontal  axis. 
In the Copes model (Figure 7) whether or not total 
revenue declines depends upon the elasticity (or slope) 
of the supply and demand curves. It is possible, with a 
highly inelastic demand curve, that total revenue wodd 
increase rather than decrease. It is also likely, unless the 
demand  curve  is  totally  elastic (horizontal),  that  the 
number  of  fishermen could  actually increase. Without 
knowledge  of  the  elasticities, the effects of a techno- 
logical  advance  on  total  revenue and employment  are 
thus indeterminate. However, "there is a prima facie case 
to be made in Figure 7 that a shift (in the supply curve) 
from S to S'  would mean an increase in the number of 
equivalent  units  of  fishing  effort,  because  the  inter- 
section with the demand curve is higher on the S' curve 
than  on  the  S  curve.  The  number  of units of fishing 
effort is not shown directly in Figure 7, but it increases 
monotonically  as  one moves upwards on the S and S' 
curves"  (Copes, pers.  comrn.).  Whether the increase in 
units of fishing effort will result in increased numbers of 
fishermen  depends  on  the  degree  to which  the  new 
technology is labor-saving. 
Despite these  different  conclusions regarding effects 
of technological change on revenue and employment of 
fishermen, both models  predict  that more overfishing 
would result. While productivity and income may increase 
initially for those with access to  the improved technology, 
there would be an eventual decline in both productivity 
and hence income  for the majority  of  fishermen. It is 
important  to remember that the purpose of this discus- 
sion  is  to  elucidate  means  of  improving  fishermen's 
incomes. Vessel and gear upgrading thus does not appear 
to be one of them. 
A reduction in input cost, such as might occur from a 
fuel subsidy or from the design of cheaper vessels that 
retain  the  same  catching  capacity,  will  also  result  in 
increased fishing effort. The downward shift in the total 
cost curve is shown for the traditional model in Figure 6, 
and the shift in the supply curve which is caused by the 
reduced average cost per unit of output is shown for the 
Copes model in Figure 7. The reduced average cost, and 
the higher profits achieved as a result, attract additional 
fishermen until a new equilibrium is reached where total 
costs  equal  total  revenue.  As  resulted from a techno- 
logical advance, the result of an input cost reduction is 
also increased overfishing, a lower sustainable yield, and 
a higher price. Total revenue may be higher or lower de- 
pending upon the elasticities of supply and demand. The 
difference between technological change and cost reduc- tions is that in the former the overfishing results from 
the use of more productive vessels and gear, while in the 
latter the overfishing results from increased numbers of 
fishermen using the original or perhaps cheaper vessels 
and gear with the same catching capacity. 
Finally  the  models  can  be  helpful in depicting the 
effects of price increases, such as might be secured by 
a  cooperative  with  increased  bargaining  power,  by 
technology  that  reduces  spoilage  after  catch,  or  as  a 
result  of  an  upward  shift  in  demand.  The increased 
prices produce  increased profits  which in turn attract 
more  fishermen, thus increasing total costs until a new 
equilibrium  is  reached  where  total  costs  again  equal 
total revenue (Figure  5). Again the  'traditional'  model 
is  somewhat  confusing because  though  the total reve- 
nue  curve  has  shifted  upward,  the  sustainable  yield 
curve has not. As shown in Figure 8, the 'Copes' model 
clearly shows the  shift in  demand which results in in- 
creased  overfishing  and  hence  reduced  quantity  pro- 
duced.  There  will be  no  benefits  to the  fishermen in 
the  long  run.  Of  course,  reductions  in  waste that in- 
crease  quantity  and  quality  of  fish available will pro- 
duce benefits for consumers. 
It is recognized that these three scenarios are abstract 
models of reality where fishing costs are not uniform, 
where  there  is  variation  in  the  length  of  the  fishing 
season,  and  where  fishermen  are  not  always  free  to 
enter and leave  the industry. Despite these simplifying 
assumptions that have permitted some degree of abstrac- 
tion, the implications seem very clear. Once a traditional 
fishery is overexploited, the only solution with any long- 
range outlook is  one  that reduces fishing effort, either 
through  limitations  on  entry  or harvesting power  or 
through sufficient incentives in alternate activities. Given 
the thought (and costs) of trying to manage 3.5 million 
traditional fishermen, planners would be excused if they 
opted for the latter! 
A major question that must be addressed and answered, 
therefore, before development planning for the traditional 
fisheries  can  achieve  any  degree  of  sophistication  is 
whether  or not the exploited resources are biologically 
overfished. If the MSY has not yet been reached (and TC 
intersects  TR beyond  MSY),  development  approaches 
that increase fishing effort can achieve some short-term 
success. Once the MSY  has been surpassed, overfishing 
will continue  even  without  the  prodding provided by 
development projects. 
As  observed by  Sainsbury (1977)  development pro- 
grams  in  the  1960s continued  to be  based  upon  up- 
grading  of  production  technology  despite  Harnlisch's 
appeal for broadening the scope of alternatives. Because 
the individual fisherman's  attempts to improve his vessel 
and  gear  were  often hampered by lack of capital, the 
major  mechanism  for introducing the new technology 
was through  various credit schemes, most often tied to 
the formation of cooperatives through which the fmanc- 
ing  could  be  administered.  A  second,  often  implicit 
objective  of  such  credit  schemes  was  to  reduce  the 
dependence  of  traditional  fishermen upon middlemen, 
input suppliers, and owners of gear and boat. 
On  the  whole  these attempts to provide  supervised 
credit have not been successful (Lawson  1972; Elliston 
1976).  In  some  cases even though  the loans have  not 
been  repaid, the improved gear has not been returned 
either, and the programs have later been characterized as 
"social financing" (Baum and Maynard  1976e). 
Lawson (1972)  completed  a thorough assessment of 
credit programs for artisanal fishermen in Southeast Asia 
in  1972, and her  observations regarding the  failure of 
loan  schemes due to technological, economic, and socio- 
logical reasons bear repeating here: 
1. Inappropriate technology, lack of adequate experi- 
mentation or support. 
2. Lack  of  supervision  resulting in  expenditure  by 
fishermen on consumption,  rather  than on production 
goods such as gear and boats. 
3. Lack  of  debt  management  and  no  discipline  of 
defaulters. 
4. Difficulty  in  finding  appropriate  collateral  as 
security  for  the  loan  when  so  few  fishermen  have 
material possessions that would satisfy collateral require- 
ments. 
5. Inadequate  credit, in that either only part of the 
improved gear or vessel could be purchased, the remain- 
der  having  to come  from the moneylender source, or 
failure to cover short-term working capital requirements. 
6. Fixed  periodic  loan  repayment  schedules while 
fishing income was subject to seasonal fluctuations. 
7. Difficulty  in  collecting payment  from fishermen 
who frequently off-loaded their catch elsewhere or sold 
it at sea to avoid payment. 
8. Diversion of loans to nonfishermen. 
9. Lack of supportive training programs. 
10. Lack of spare parts or maintenance facilities caused 
by too many types of engines being introduced at one 
time. 
11. Lack of supporting infrastructure such as landing 
facilities, ice and cold storage plants, processing facilities, 
and roads. 
12. Lack of adequate marketing system to absorb the 
increased supply. 
13. Community  resistance to programs that disrupted 
existing social relationships and ignored traditional sanc- 
tions for repayment. 
Many of these same reasons for failure were confirmed 
by Elliston (1976), who examined the cooperative pro- gram in Malaysia. Gibbons (1976)  added one important 
factor  that  has been  prevalent throughout  the region; 
that is, the manipulation of schemes by the local elite 
for  political  reasons, particularly where  a  cooperative 
was  involved and where  cooperative membership was a 
prerequisite for loan approval. In an extreme case, new 
gear  and vessels  introduced to Muncar, Indonesia were 
destroyed by  villagers, and it was  hypothesized by  an 
observer (Emerson  1976) that the underlying causes 
were  related to concepts of community justice and the 
fact  that  the project appeared to result in benefit for 
only  a  favored  few,  while  the  vast majority were ex- 
cluded. 
Several of the shortcomings cited by Lawson (1972) 
were  corrected  where  possible  in  later  schemes.  The 
Philippines' imaginative attempts to solve the problem of 
inadequate vessels  and  gear  and  of  dependency  upon 
middlemen  indicate  the  extreme  complexity  of  the 
problem. In addition to the use of cooperative channels, 
loans were  provided  to seldas or groups of five  fisher- 
men. Each member was provided with his own gear and 
boat and was to guarantee repayment by the other four 
selda members. The attempt to build in moral persuasion 
to repay through the relationships inherent in the selda 
were  not  successful.  Fishermen, most  of whom do not 
own land, often simply picked up stakes and moved to 
another location. Boats and gear were sold back to  sup- 
pliers  who then resold them. The apparent lack of loan 
supervision  doomed  the  project  from  the  start.  By 
December 3 1,1977  the Development Bank of the Philip- 
pines had lent approximately f  308 million ($42 million) 
to 75,225 fishermen under this scheme. The default rate 
subsequently exceeded 75% (Business Day  1978), and 
the  selda  program  was  halted!  Currently  loans  are 
channeled  through  fishermen's  associations, where the 
gear is jointly owned in contrast to the individual owner- 
ship  possible  through  the  selda  and  where  training, 
supervision, and marketing assistance are integral com- 
ponents of the program. One major problem remaining, 
however, is that  rural banks are generally reluctant to 
provide  the  collateral-free  loans  that  the  fishermen's 
associations require for their improved gear. 
Because of these difficulties, the cycle of indebtedness 
and low productivity remains the predominant condition 
of the vast  majority of  traditional fishermen. It is also 
apparent from the experience with vessel and gear tech- 
nology programs that they offer little hope of raising the 
standard of living of the majority of traditional fisher- 
men. Undoubtedly there are areas where underexploita- 
4~he  Development Bank  of the Philippines reports that all 
but 536 of these accounts are in arrears. 
tion  of  resources will  permit  such  an  approach on a 
limited  scale,  but  a  long-term  view  of  the  problem 
demands that other alternatives  be explored. 
Recapitulating, the theoretical possibility of biological 
constraints (resource  limitations) has long been recog- 
nized, but only in recent years in tropical fisheries have 
clear-cut cases of overfishing been sufficiently convincing 
for the practical aspects to be  recognized. Increases in 
productivity from traditional fisheries were  thought to 
be achievable through the application of upgraded tech- 
nology. Currently technology per se does not appear to 
be a constraint as the necessary and more efficient pro- 
duction  techniques  exist.  Introducing  them  to tradi- 
tional fishing communities, however, has proved  to be 
most  difficult,  frequently  self-defeating,  and  what  is 
worse,  often  reinforcing inequities in income distribu- 
tion. The belief persists in some quarters, however, that 
the  failure  of  fisheries development  programs  can  be 
attributed to the traditional fishermen and their unwill- 
ingness  to adopt the new techniques, and to adapt to 
their effects. It was the conclusion of an ICLARM work- 
shop in June  1978, in contrast, that rather than lying 
solely  with  the  fisherman, the relevant socioeconomic 
and  institutional  constraints can  be  traced  in  a  large 
measure  to  the  limited and  narrow  perspectives that 
developers  and  other  change  agents  hold  regarding 
traditional fishermen and the resources that are available 
to them. The problems that are related to  these perspec- 
tives are suppositional, rather than empirical in nature. 
SUPPOSITIONAL PROBLEMS 
An  earlier  distinction was  made  between empirical 
and suppositional problems. Empirical problems, such as 
those discussed in the previous section, involve the con- 
crete needs of  fishermen for a standard of living above 
the bare subsistence level and thus involve contributing 
factors such as limited resources, inadequate vessels and 
gear, lack of market power, lack of alternative income, 
and  inflatlbn.  Suppositional problems  are  those  that 
relate to the assumptions that decision makers put for- 
ward  regarding  behavior  of  fishermen, the  social  and 
economic structure  of  the communities in which  pro- 
duction  and  distribution take place, the extent of the 
resource base, and the likely effects of development proj- 
ects. The term  'decision  makers'  is broad and includes 
fishermen  and  entrepreneurs  providing  inputs  and 
handling  fish  distribution,  in  addition  to government 
officials  and other individuals and  institutions that in- 
fluence fishing in its broadest sense. 
The  June  1978 ICLARM  traditional fisheries work- 
shop  discussed  these  suppositional problems  in  detail and  workshop  conclusions  are  summarized  here.  In 
looking  for  solutions to the  critical problems of  tra- 
ditional fishermen, the participants endorsed approaches 
that take into account the particular socioeconomic and 
cultural context of the community and its own sense of 
priorities,  and  place  fishermen  at  the  center  of  any 
changes to be proposed, whether they be in technology, 
institution-building,  or  marketing.  This  suggested  ap- 
proach, which is consistent with those adopted by rural 
development programs, acknowledges that programs not 
supported by fishermen themselves have little chance of 
success. 
"An  essential requirement from the start is to find 
out and take into account the hopes, needs and aspira- 
tions  of  the  fishermen  and  their  communities and  to 
ensure that they understand and agree with the objec- 
tives  of  the  project  and  become  fully involved in it" 
(FA0  1975, p. 14). 
This  does  not  mean  that  fishermen-centered solu- 
tions are necessarily always optimal, but it does mean 
that changes that are sensitive to the perspective of the 
traditional fishermen are more likely to  succeed. 
What  are  those  perspectives?  Too  often  outsiders 
have  assumed  that  fishermen  are homogenous, imrno- 
bile,  and  irrational.  No  generalization holds across all 
cases,  of  course, but the opposite assumptions distort 
reality less. 
First, traditional  fnhing communities and fishermen 
are  heterogenous. A holistic view  of fishing communi- 
ties  including  all  those  dependent  upon  or having  a 
stake in the fishery in addition to the fishermen them- 
selves, including middlemen and other marketers, boat- 
owners,  shopkeepers, village  officials, and  fishermen's 
families who may market and share the catch. Develop- 
ment projects focused narrowly on catchers of fish may 
end up being subverted by nonproducers who have been 
left  out of  official plans.  Traditional producers them- 
selves also differ greatly, for example, in terms of their 
individual fishing task (if  they are laborers on another's 
boat) or in terms of gear used, local reputation, and the 
degree to which they engage in fishing full- or part-time. 
Marketing  systems also show great variation among 
middlemen based upon  the services that each provides. 
On  the  one hand, one can differentiate intermediaries 
according to the functions they perform, such as trans- 
port, storage, processing, risk bearing, market informa- 
tion,  and  buying  and  selling.  Alternatively  one  can 
distinguish  among  intermediaries  in  an  institutional 
sense;  that  is,  among  retailers,  wholesalers,  brokers, 
commissionmen,  processors,  speculators,  and  facilita- 
tive organizations such as financial institutions, auctions, 
or providers of public market news (Kohls and Downey 
1972). Within  fisheries market  systems, intermediaries 
may  fulfill  a  multiplicity  of  functions  and  these  are 
neither static nor necessarily confmed to fishery prod- 
ucts.  A  "standard  package"  approach  that  does not 
take  these  differences in  the production  and distribu- 
tion sectors into account is that much less likely to be 
effective (Ondam  1977). 
It  is  also  important  to understand  the  extent to 
which  fishing  community  households  depend  exclu- 
sively  on  fishing. After  an  examination  of  household 
census  results  for  1971  in  the  Philippines,  Castillo 
(1977)  was  able  to conclude that the more  rural  and 
agricultural the area, the more frequent was  the diver- 
sity  of  household  income  sources.  She hypothesized 
that this was due to the lower income from rural activ- 
ities and the desire to reduce the risk that dependence 
upon  a  single  activity  would  entail.  The  implication 
is that development projects that are biased in favor of 
full-time fishermen and discourage subsistence producers 
from diversifying their sources of income may hurt them 
by making them more vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
availability  and  salability  of  fish, and may ignore the 
reasons that former full-time fishermen had for becoming 
part-time  in  the  first  place  (Emmerson  1978).  If  a 
biological constraint already exists, the effects of  such 
increased pressure on the resource would actually lower 
rather than raise fishermen's incomes. 
Second, many traditional fishermen are highly mobile 
both  geographically  and  occupationally, in  that  they 
migrate in response to changing agricultural and fishing 
seasons,  and  psychologically,  in  that  they  are  eager 
to adopt and adapt to new activities that will raise their 
incomes. In  five  community  studies conducted in the 
Philippines  (Baum  and  Maynard  1976a,b,c,d,e)  it was  ' 
found for example, that depending on the community, 
anywhere from 20% to 65% of respondents were willing 
to leave  fishing for another  occupation. Modernization 
and  commercialization have  rendered  increasingly in- 
valid  the  image  of  fishing  communities  as  isolated 
entities cut off from the outside world. What this means 
for development policy is that traditional fisheries must 
be  visualized  as  enmeshed in larger rural  and national 
frameworks of communication  and  interchange where 
fishermen themselves are becoming aware of alternatives. 
Third, traditional fishermen should be assumed to act 
rationally in terms of their own perceptions and prefer- 
ences.  An  outside sponsor of development who offers 
subsistence producers a high-gain but high-risk strategy 
is asking them to act against their own primary interest. 
A traditional low-gain, low-risk strategy in which middle- 
men shoulder the burden of riskin the market, guarantee 
producers  an  outlet  for their production, and provide 
loans for consumption in times of need, may seem more 
attractive to traditional  fishermen than an uncertain, if potentially more promising, alternative offered by govern- 
ment.  Once  traditional  fishermen  are  assumed  to be 
rationally  preoccupied  with  survival  (Lawson  1975) 
development decision makers can better mesh the prob- 
able  benefits  of  new  arrangements  with  the  proven 
benefits  of  old  ones.  To  accomplish this,  traditional 
institutions for sharing the value  of the catch and the 
ways in which these are affected  by technological and 
other  changes  should be a major  focus in researching, 
planning,  and  monitoring  fishery-specific development 
projects. 
In  addition  to  these  assumptions  regarding  fisher- 
men's  attitudes,  assumptions are  also frequently  made 
regarding  relationships  between  fishermen  and  those 
input suppliers and marketers upon which they depend. 
Government  planners,  anxious  to  demonstrate  their 
commitment to changing the status quo, often overlook 
the productive role of middlemen and assume that all are 
exploiting the fishermen from whom they purchase catch. 
Sufficient  qualifications  to this  supposition have been 
presented  in  this  paper  to indicate  the importance  of 
a  reexamination  of these assumptions before  state-run 
marketing corporations are established. 
Emmersan (1978) points to the high level of subjec- 
tivity  that  accompanies all  levels  of fisheries develop- 
ment planning and suggests that while it is probably not 
realistic to achieve total objectivity, the researcher can at 
least "try  to ensure that official biases are constructive" 
(p. N-5). All too often the social costs of development 
programs are  overlooked (Juanite  1978). Certainly the 
negative  repercussions resulting  from  many vessel  and 
gear  technology  programs  demonstrate  the need  for a 
more  objective look at all development alternatives and 
their  potential  social  costs  and  benefits,  so  that  net 
social benefits can be maximized. Despite the need for 
such  an  approach,  however, it is  difficult to translate 
such a recommendation into action. Besides the general 
lack of information  available to decision makers, there 
is also a wide gap between the theory of welfare maxi- 
mization  and the practical decisions that must be made 
immediately to raise the standard of living of traditional 
fishermen.  One  very  important  step in  developing  an 
appreciation  for these suppositional problems is  an in- 
depth examination of the development planning process, 
its  objectives,  and  its  implementation,  probably  best 
undertaken on a country-by-country basis. 
POSSIBLE GENERALIZATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
If  one were to come up with a simple generalization 
regarding the traditional  fisheries sector, it would most 
likely be  "too  many  fishermen, not enough fish" (Bar- 
dach  1977). Given this situation certain common-sense 
conclusions  can  be  reached  regarding  the  alternatives 
available to decision makers. At the risk of oversimplify- 
ing, these can be  summarized here:  (also see Table 9). 
1. Despite the fact that vessel and gear improvement 
may benefit small numbers of fishermen in the short run, 
such an emphasis on production technology, except in 
very specific locales where resources are not yet fully ex- 
ploited biologically, will likely have very high social costs 
in  terms  of (a)  disruption  to the social and economic 
fabric of the communities concerned; (b) the low return 
on government investment that appears to result from 
such schemes; and (c) increased overfishing. 
2. Programs  to  subsidize  the  traditional  fisheries 
through government price control over inputs or through 
provision of inputs at less than the market price will most 
likely lead to increased fishing pressure on the resource, 
but will in the short-term allow accommodation of an 
increased number of fishermen. 
3. Programs  to legislate  inefficiency by prohibiting 
introduction  of labor-saving vessels or gear, while meet- 
ing  short-term  objectives of  maintaining  employment, 
will  most  likely  lead  to continued  stagnation  of  the 
sector. 
4. Improvements  in  marketing  and  postharvest 
technology  will  not  necessarily  result  in  increases in 
prices  received by the traditional fishermen. Depending 
upon  the  market  power  of intermediaries, and on the 
elasticities of  supply  and  demand  at  each link in the 
marketing chain, the resulting benefits from waste reduc- 
tion may accrue in part to  the middlemen, to the ultimate 
consumers, or to both. Even if the resulting benefits take 
the form of increased prices received by fishermen, they 
will  probably  be  dissipated  as  more  fishermen  are 
attracted to the resource, and further overfishing results. 
Intermediate  processing  technology  may  present  an 
opportunity for fishermen to receive some of the profits 
previously received by middlemen. 
5. Rural  development  programs  that  lead  to coop- 
erative or other organizational development will, to the 
extent they result in higher prices received, most likely 
encourage more fishermen to enter the industry and thus 
further contribute to overfishing. If cooperatives or fish- 
ermen acting individually take over some of the functions 
previously  performed by middlemen, their incomes will 
presumably be increased to the extent that they are able 
to capture the profits previously enjoyed by the middle- 
men. 
6. Rural  development programs  that  provide  alter- 
native sources of income to fishermen and their families 
on  the  other  hand,  represent  the  only  method  that 
reduces fishing effort and thus the only long-term solu- 
tion that offers any  chance of raising the standards of living of  those  who remain in the traditional  fisheries 
sector. 
7. Doing  nothing  by  adopting  a policy  of  benign 
neglect,  while  possibly  resulting in  transformation  in 
fishing communities through natural social and economic 
forces, is  politically unacceptable at this time. Also  if 
fisheries  are  an  activity  of  last  resort  for  many,  the 
hoped-for  movement  of  fishermen out of  fishing may 
not occur. 
Given the large numbers of traditional fishermen, the 
above  conclusions make  the  situation  appear  dismal, 
indeed. Moreover  there  is  a  strong possibility  of con- 
flict between individual fishing community perspectives 
of appropriate response to empirical problems and the 
generalizations  drawn above. However the attitudes of 
fishermen  to  geographical  and  occupational  change 
appear  to offer  an  opportunity,  not  a  constraint  to 
development. Once  traditional  fishing community per- 
spectives are understood, it appears that change will be 
Table 9. Eifects of development alternatives on traditional fi~hermen.~ 
possible  as long as the fishermen themselves are able to 
participate in the decision making that leads to the intro- 
duction of new or alternative income-generating methods 
or activities. 
It is clear from past experience in both developed and 
developing countries that the traditional fishermen will 
bear  the brunt  of the burden of changing and adapting 
to the pressure of modernization. Marketing and post- 
harvest technology improvement may provide temporary 
benefits.  Government's  employment-related  goals  and 
programs to halt rural-urban drift and improve rural in- 
comes may provide short-term respite for traditional fish- 
ermen through their emphasis on labor-using rather than 
labor-saving technology,  as  recommended by  Lawson 
(1977). 
It is  common to hear arguments that the traditional 
fishermen  must  be  protected  from  rapacious  trawlers 
and other industrial fisheries. Proponents of this point 
of  view  would  argue, it is presumed, for legislated in- 
First- and second-round effects on: 
Productivity  No. of  (Sustainable yield)  Income of 
Development method  (catch per fisherman)  Prices  fishermen  resource  fishermen 
Vessel and gear upgrading 
Restrict fishing effort 
Subsidize industry 
(lower input cost) 







increases for a few;  increase 
declines for most 
increase for those  indeterminate 
who remain 
declines  increase 
declines  possibly 
increase 
declines  possibly 
increase 
increases for those  indeterminate 
who remain 
indeterminate,  more overfishing 
(depends in part 
on degree of 
labor-saving) 
reduced  less overfishiig 
increased  more overfishing 
increased  more overfishing 
increased  more overfishing 
reduced  less overfishing 
increase for 
a few (in short 
run only) 
probable de- 





clime (in long 
run) 
possibly in- 
crease (in short 
run only) 
possibly in- 
crease (in short 
run only) 
increases 
a~ssumptions:  1)  The fishery is already exploited to that point where TR = TC and all economic rent is dissipated; that is, economic 
overfishing already occurring. 
2)  The fishery is already biologically overfished; that is, MSY has been exceeded. Note that assumptions (2) and (3) toge- 
ther imply that the TC curve intersects the TR curve beyond MSY.  There may be cases where this is not true; that is, 
for all economic rent to be dissipated before MSY  is reached. 
3)  Freedom of entry and exit. efficiencies  such  as  banning  of  trawlers  from  coastal 
waters. In the short run, but in the short run only, this 
may make sense from a social point  of view. (It never 
makes sense from an economic efficiency point of view 
because it increases the costs of fishing.) In other words, 
so  the argument goes, there is some socially optimum 
yield  (OSY)  between  MEY  and  MSY  that takes into 
account other noneconomic (nonefficiency) goals such 
as  employment  or  social  stability.  The  problem  with 
this approach, however, is that in the long run it con- 
demns  the  majority  of  traditional  fishermen to their 
present cycle of poverty and indebtedness. Even a policy 
of  benign  neglect  could  result  in a  more  rapid,  and 
thus in the long-run less socially costly, transformation. 
If  stagnation of the traditional  fisheries sector is to be 
avoided, an  ultimate  solution will necessitate reducing 
the number  of fishermen or reducing the fishing effort 
through  active  and  concerted  government  programs 
and  incentives that  provide  alternative  income oppor- 
tunities to a traditional fishing sector that at present has 
few, or none at all. 
Alternatives for Research 
RESEARCH TO COMPLEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS 
It was argued in the Introduction that while a major 
purpose  of development programs is to raise  the stan- 
dard of living of traditional fishermen, the goal of research 
is to expand and clarify the alternative choices available 
to decision makers, be  they  government policy makers 
or project managers, private entrepreneurs, or fishermen 
themselves.  The  preceding section, in its discussion of 
alternative solutions to the problem  of low living stan- 
dards,  has presented certain conclusions, based  on the 
one  hand,  on  theoretical  models  of  the  fishery that 
incorporate biological and economic parameters, and on 
the other hand, on a review of development programs 
and of changing perspectives regarding the constraints to 
development of the traditional fisheries sector. Combina- 
tions  of  biological,  socioeconomic,  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent, technological constraints  to raising living stan- 
dards have been identified. While broad conclusions have 
been  drawn regarding the long-term potential  of alter- 
native  development  approaches, the seriousness of the 
problems  facing  traditional  fishermen  demands  that 
short-term solutions also be found. The need for locale- 
specific information  thus  remains, so that where  they 
exist,  underexploited  resources can  be  identified  and 
tapped,  and  so  that  local  institutions,  attitudes,  and 
socioeconomic conditions can be understood  and incor- 
porated into development programs. 
Research in  traditional  fisheries should  have  as  its 
long-term objective the developing of a capacity to pro- 
vide answers not only to questions that can be raised in 
connection  with  alternative  development  thrusts,  but 
also to evaluate the alternatives vis-a-vis each other. The 
need  to evaluate  the  alternatives leads, however, to a 
further research-related constraint; that is, the statistics 
and  other  preliminary  analytic  studies to permit  such 
evaluations in  a  convincing  empirical manner  are gen- 
erally not yet available in Southeast Asia or the South- 
west  Pacific.  For  example,  stock  assessment  and esti- 
mates of sustainable yields require time series data even 
for a single species fishery. The task is seriously compli- 
cated by the multispecies stocks exploited by traditional 
fishermen in the tropics where catch and effort data are 
generally  not available.  Effort  is now being expended 
throughout the Southeast Asian region in an attempt to 
determine  these parameters, but success is hampered by 
a lack of expertise in population  dynamics and by the 
apparent inapplicability of single species models to multi- 
species fisheries (Pauly  1979). 
It is apparent that a multidisciplinary perspective of 
potential constraints and alternatives is necessary, and it 
helps to pose the major questions related to each so that 
the link between  empirical and suppositional problems 
can become clear. Based upon the earlier categorization 
of alternative methods of raising incomes, the most press- 
ing questions are : 
1. Vessel and Gear Improvement 
Will the resources permit the expansion in effort that 
improved production technology implies? To  what extent 
does technology displace fishermen?  What are fishermen's 
attitudes toward  technological change? What forms are 
most  appropriate?  To  what  extent  does  it  disrupt 
community  social  structure  and  make  income  levels 
more unequal? How broadly based can participation in 
technology advances be? 
2. Marketing Improvement 
Will  reductions in marketing inefficiencies (technical 
and price) result in higher prices received by fishermen, 
in lower prices paid by consumers, or some combination 
of both, or will the benefits be captured by intermedia- 
ries in the form of higher profits? Will  the development of  alternative market  outlets (e.g.,  frozen, dried, pro- 
cessed) or improved infrastructure result in higher fisher- 
men's  incomes? Will a more efficient distribution system 
increase  the fishing pressure  on the resource? Will  the 
provision  of  intermediate processing  technology allow 
fishermen  to  capture  some  of  the  profits  previously 
received  by  middlemen? -What is the most  appropriate 
form of management and/or guidance for the marketing 
system? What, if  anything, should be the government's 
role? 
3. Institution Building 
Will  the formation of fishermen's cooperatives, asso- 
ciations, or other formal and informal groupings lead to 
increases  in  production  and/or increases  in  prices  re- 
ceived? Will dependency of fishermen on middlemen and 
boatowners be reduced as a result? How broad can partic- 
ipation in the new or adapted institutions  be? What will 
be  the effects of institutions on levels of and equity of 
community  income? Will  fishermen's  organizations en- 
courage  conservation of  the resource? What  should be 
the government's role in institution building? 
4. Effort Reduction 
Will  reducing the fishing effort result in higher catch 
and  income  for those that remain? What  management 
tools can be developed to limit fishing eff~rt?~  How can 
they be implemented? Can they be enforced? Can reduc- 
tions in effort be achieved by encouraging full-time fish- 
ermen to become part-time? Can nonfish capture sectors, 
such as aquaculture and agriculture, absorb those fisher- 
men displaced? What alternative activities are sufficiently 
attractive  to fishermen  to encourage  them  to reduce 
their  fishing  effort?  Will  education and  training pro- 
grams  designed  primarily for children of fishermen re- 
sult in a reduction of fishing effort? What are the atti- 
tudes of fishermen towards effort reduction? 
In  addition  to these  four  alternatives  which  deal 
primarily  with  the  fishermen  themselves  and  are thus 
fishery-specific, development policy  and  accompanymg 
research may not be directed specifically towards fishery- 
specific solutions but rather at (5) rural development, or 
a  general  uplifting of  the rural sector, thus equipping 
rural dwellers, including fishermen, with the skills and 
awareness to adapt to their changing society. For exam- 
 gain, the  appropriate  management  tools will  depend in 
part  upon whether  the underlying problem is one of 'growth' 
or  'recruitment'  overfishing,  or  some  combination  of  both. 
ple it is essential that the role of fishing relative to other 
rural activities be  clearly understood, and that external 
linkages  to  political,  social,  religious,  and  economic 
structures  and  institutions (including  government)  be 
explored. Indeed, integrated or area rural development 
programs,  as  distinct  from broader national programs, 
have  become  popular  throughout the Southeast Asian 
region for this reason, but  fishermen are still not gen- 
erally included in the target group. Moreover, as pointed 
out by  a recent consultative group from the Southeast 
Asian region (SCS  1977), horizontally integrated devel- 
opment  schemes are  much  more  difficult to conceive 
and  manage  than  vertically  integrated  development 
schemes. 
Despite the  relative simplicity of vertical integration 
and  associated  pilot  projects, however,  long-term im- 
provement  in  living  standards of  fishing  communities 
will be  attained only as improvements are concurrently 
achieved throughout rural areas, of which fishing com- 
munities  are  but  a  part.  A host of  research questions 
thus  relate  to  potential,  approaches,  and  attitudes 
regarding rural development programs. 
The above questions relate to the major policy alter- 
natives.  The  categorization  of  problems  facing  tradi- 
tional fishermen and the subsequent discussion of alter- 
native  solutions  suggest  two  approaches,  which  are 
definitely not mutually exclusive, through which research 
can play  an important, complementary role:  (1) docu- 
mentation  of  the  existence  and  degree  of  empirical 
problems and (2)  testing of hypotheses regarding suppo- 
sitional problems. 
An  examination of these approaches and some specific 
examples of each will assist in the setting of priorities or 
general  themes  by  research  organizations which  have 
identified the problems of traditional fisheries as an area 
of research concentration. 
DOCUMENTING EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS 
On  the biological side, stock assessment and estima- 
tion of sustainable yields are crucial to all development 
efforts as the theoretical models showed. Socioeconomic 
research in this category would be  primarily descriptive 
and would include the type of community profiles that 
are becoming more  readily available throughout South- 
east  Asia.  While  providing extremely valuable baseline 
information, this descriptive work is primarily static in 
nature  presenting  a picture  of income and  social indi- 
cators in fishing communities at a point in time. Annual 
data, if presented, are based  on the recollection of re- 
spondents, and thus potentially suffer from extreme bias. 
An  exception to these usually  static surveys is the arn- bitious Rural Dynamics Study presently being conducted 
in Java, Indonesia, by the Ago-Economic Survey. The 
study includes  three  coastal villages in its sample and 
considerable  data,  including  household  income  and 
labor  allocation  that  cover  up  to a  5-yr period,  are 
now  available  to permit  some preliminary conclusions 
regarding change in these rural areas (Collier et al.  1977). 
Data  have  been  collected  monthly,  thus  reducing the 
recollection  bias.  It must  be  recognized at the  outset 
that  dynamic  research  of  this  type  is  expensive, and 
there are limitations to the extent that national generali- 
zations can be  drawn from a three-village sample. This 
approach, however, is consistent with earlier exhortations 
that  development  projects  and  accompanying research 
must be locale-specific and multisectoral, and can provide 
valuable  insights  into  changing  land,  labor, and  other 
resource use. 
As development programs move to become more ver- 
tically  integrated  and  less  purely  production-oriented, 
the  necessity  for  knowledge  about linkages in the  re- 
source/fisherman/distribution  continuum increases and 
thus provides a fruitful area for research. For example 
an examination of the price structure and rates of return 
through  the  entire  distribution  system would indicate 
possible  areas where increases in competition would be 
beneficial,  and  whether  prices  received  by  fishermen 
would likely increase as a result.  Returns to fishermen 
that represent 30-40% of the consumer price of fish are 
comparable to those received  by primary producers in 
other  activities,  but  until  fisheries  marketing  costs 
including risk  are  identified,  some  observers will  con- 
tinue to think these returns are too low a share of con- 
sumer  expenditure  and  thus  warrant  intervention. 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN RELATION TO 
SUPPOSITIONAL  PROBLEMS 
On  the  other hand  traditional  fisheries research can 
test  hypotheses  regarding  suppositional problems. The 
purpose  of  studies  that  examine mobility,  rationality, 
atld heterogeneity issues, for example, would be to pro- 
vide a more balanced perspective of fishermen's behavior 
and attitudes towards change, including willingness and 
ability to seek alternative employment  outside capture 
fishing. 
The necessity for coordinating research of the empir- 
ical and  suppositional categories is obvious if one is to 
move  beyond  the descriptive and become analytic. For 
example  the  establishing  of  functional  relationships 
between  empirical problems and behavioral characteris- 
tics of fishermen and their communities might point to 
ways in which empirical problems can be solved. Alter- 
natively, perhaps positive correlation  can be shown be- 
tween  diversity of income sources and land ownership, 
implying that land reform programs that include landless 
fishing families could raise family incomes. Frederick J. 
Smith (1974) cautions against the unquestioning use of 
functional  models  drawn  from  the agricultural sector, 
however.  While  producdon  and  profit  functions com- 
monly  used  by  economists  to shed light on producer 
behavior can make use of capital, land, labor, and man- 
agement inputs to explain a high degree of the variance 
among explanatory and dependent variables in an agri- 
cultural setting, the  same is probably not true for the 
fishing sector where "it  is .  . .  hypothesized that natural 
biological variability and externalities would explain a 
significant  variation  in  profit"  (p.  1043).  Again,  the 
need for multidisplinary research is apparent. 
Pursuing this  argument  for  hypothesis-testing  a bit 
further for the moment, Lampe (1978) has argued ihe 
case  for  including demand analysis into fisheries plan- 
ning for fish and fishery products. The income and price 
elasticities of demand which can be crudely estimated 
from  survey  data  would  be  particularly  valuable  to 
planners  who  are  fortunate  enough  to operate in the 
context  of  underexploited  traditional  fisheries.  Too 
often  it  is  assumed  that  supply  will  create  its own 
demand  or that substitution of imported fish products 
with  domestically caught fish can be  readily achieved. 
Certainly, Pacific island nations have experienced diffi- 
culty  in  persuading consumers to abandon their taste 
for  imported  tinned  mackerel,  with  its  frequent high 
prestige, in favor of higher priced fresh fish. While the 
lack  of  a  social  laboratory,  where  controlled  experi- 
ments  related  to demand  analysis  can  be  conducted, 
greatly  hampers  the  specification  of  exact elasticities, 
their  rough  estimation  based  on  survey  data  allows 
some predictions to be made regarding the price effects 
of  shifts  in  supply.  Also,  as  noted by  Lampe (1978) 
when  commenting  on  a  recent  survey  in  Guatemala, 
income  elasticity  estimates  allow one to make certain 
predictions  regarding  shifts  in  consumer  expenditures 
from lower class fish to higher class fish as  per  capita 
income increases. The implication, at least in Guatemala, 
is that producers of the lower class fishes will be further 
disadvantaged. A similar situation may exist in areas of 
the  South  Pacific.  However  in  Southeast Asia  where 
population  expansion  is  shifting  the  demand  curve 
upward  and  to the  right,  it is  hard  to conceive of a 
reduced demand for any species of fish. Still, estimations 
of  price  quantity  relationships  and  of  elasticities can 
shed  considerable  light  on  the  structure  of  fisheries 
markets,  and  might  suggest  areas  of  improvement  in 
distribution  systems and the need  for developing alter- 
native  product  forms  to  the  benefit  of  traditional 
fishermen. Contrary to the situation in industrial fisheries where 
production  economics research  as  discussed  by Smith 
(1974) could be of benefit to individual producers in the 
short run the pressing problems of traditional fisheries 
and fishing communities call for long range attention to 
broad policy research issues. 
CONCLUSION 
It should be clear that only through analytical research 
on both empirical and suppositional problems will it be 
possible to develop an holistic perception of traditional 
fisheries and fishing communities and their linkages with 
other sectors and institutions. 
At  the  beginning  of  this  section, certain questions 
were posed regarding each of the major policy thrusts of 
technology improvement, institution building, marketing 
improvement, and effort reduction. These questions could 
be rephrased as hypotheses to be examined as part of an 
evaluation of development alternatives. This area would 
include research related to rural development programs 
in all their variety and the possible benefits to be derived 
by fishing communities from their more specific inclu- 
sion within such programs. Or, for example it would be 
possible to design a research project that monitored the 
effects  of  a  cooperative or  association  on  traditional 
fishermen's income and community structure. Or, more 
ambitiously the  impact  of  port development or other 
infrastructure improvements could be monitored to see 
to what extent benefits accrued to the small-scale fisher- 
men. 
Traditional fisheries research should also be directed 
towards the development of management programs and 
tools. It is reasonably clear that in the very near future, 
ways  must be  found to regulate the amount of effort 
expended in certain overfished areas. What forms of com- 
munity and governmental organizations can be developed 
to deal with management problems? Should or can the 
controls center on industrial or traditional fishermen or 
both? What are the most appropriate forms of controls? 
One might be inclined to think that it is unheard of to 
argue for controls on effort in the context of fisherman 
poverty.  However, a long-run view  of the potential  of 
the  coastal resources  demands that  such  management 
programs  and  controls  be  devised  and  implemented. 
Particularly in the area of socioeconomics, much of 
the previous research on traditional fisheries in the trop- 
ics has been essentially descriptive. When research funds 
are limited the usefulness of research is much reduced 
unless it is undertaken preliminary to or in conjunction 
with  government  programs  or  community  initiatives 
that  seek  to raise  the standard of living of  traditional 
fishermen.  Above  all,  an  analytical  framework  and 
methodology is required if the results of research are to 
be useful to decision makers. 
To  some  extent  success  in  policy-related research 
will  depend upon the availability of reliable secondary 
data and of previous studies based on surveys. Although 
steps  are  being  taken  in  most  countries  to improve 
collection and reporting of statistics, it will be some time 
before these data are of sufficient scope and cover suffi- 
cient  time  to allow sound analysis of policy issues to 
proceed. In  certain other countries where this informa- 
tion  is  already  available,  fisheries  development  and 
management issues such as surplus fishermen and con- 
flicts between  traditional  and  industrial  fisheries have 
already been  addressed. It is fair to conclude that with 
much variation in data availability and in the quantity 
and  quality  of  previous  fisheries research,  choices  of 
priorities  among  alternative  research  approaches  will 
vary  from  country  to  country,  and  from  region  to 
region. 
Despite variability in research approaches and method- 
ology  however,  the  urgent  nature  of the problems of 
traditional  fishermen  and  their  communities demands 
that  subject  area  priorities be  set.  In  this  regard  the 
theoretical models presented in Figures 4-8 allowed the 
drawing  of  certain  conclusions  regarding  the  likely 
effects of various development thrusts. These conclusions 
were  confirmed by a brief review  of development pro- 
grams initiated to date. The futility of relying on objec- 
tives  that  directly  or  indirectly  intensify  the  level  of 
fishing  effort  (except  in  those  decreasing number  of 
cases where the resource remains underexploited) implies 
that  priority  for  development and  research should be 
given  to those  programs  that reduce  fishing intensity. 
The following four general research areas are therefore 
suggested: 
1. Assessment  of  stocks  exploited  by  traditional 
and  industrial  fishermen  and  estimation  of  maximum 
sustainable yields; 
2. Development of management  tools and programs 
appropriate for limiting fishing effort in the multispecies 
fisheries exploited by traditional and industrial fishermen; 
3. Reduction  of  waste  in  the  distribution  system 
and exploration of ways in which resulting benefits can 
be  channeled to traditional fishermen; and most impor- 
tantly , 
4. Development  of alternative or supplementary in- 
come sources for traditional fishermen and their house- 
holds. 
Complementing these priority  areas, indeed to some 
extent a necessary precondition of their application, is 
the  requirement  to develop  an  understanding, on the 
one  hand,  of  the  resource/fishermen/distribution  con- tinuurn and, on the other hand, of the linkages among  a vertical concept and the latter an horizontal concept, 
fisheries, fishing  communities, and other rural sectors,  which  taken together imply the necessity for a holistic 
and  institutions, including government. The  former is  perspective of fisheries and fishing communities. 
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Appendix:  Derivation of the Fishery Supply and Demand Model (the Copes Model) 
from the 'Traditional' ~odell 
The analysis proceeds from relationships established in the existing literature:  which are brought out through Figure 1. 
In this diagram the S.W.  quadrant remains vacant, its two axes recording, identically, varying amounts of fishing effqd. The 
S.E.  quadrant shows the relationship of output-measured  by total weight of catch-to  fishing effort, assuming a fixed pattern 
of gear se~ectivit~.~  An  important characteristic of the yield curve is that it peaks at a specific level of sustained effort, mea- 
suring at that point the 'maximum sustainable yield' (OM). 
In the N.W.  quadrant the total cost of output is recorded in relation to fishing effort. Assuming fixed techniques, fixed 
factor proportions  and a multiplicity of small fishing units, the amounts of factors used will be proportional to fishing effort. 
Cost is calculated here for all factor units at the rate of marginal opportunity costs. It therefore includes any rents that intra- 
marginal factor units may enjoy by virtue of their lower opportunity costs. Bearing in mind that some increase in rewards will 
need to be offered to divert additional factor units from alternative employment, a gradually rising cost-of-effort curve has 
been portrayed. 
From the two relationships described, total cost may be derived for each weight of output, as is shown in the N.E.  quadrant. 
The derived total cost curve may be readily converted to a cost curve per unit of output, portrayed in Figure 2. Owing to the 
stipulated condition of unrestricted entry, the fishing force (and consequent fishing effort) will adjust itself to demand con- 
ditions in such a fashion that the opportunity cost of producing a marginal unit of catch will  equal its market price. No rent is 
enjoyed at the margin; the rent that the fishery resource itself could yield having been dissipated by the unrestricted entry.5 
The curve described in Figure 2, then, relates long-run equilibrium output to each given price and is therefore in the nature of 
a long-run supply curve. 
Biometric studies suggest that for a typical fishery the yield curve will have the sigmoid shape indicated in Figure 1.6 The 
curve for total cost in relation to output will be of exactly the same shape (allowing for expansion or contraction of the scales 
used) if cost is a linear function of fishing effort, which in much of the relevant literature is considered a justifiable simplifica- 
tion.  The assumption of moderate curvature in the latter function-suggested  above-would  modify the curvature of the total 
cost curve but would not affect its general shape. The important characteristic of this total cost function is that, while cost 
increases continuously, output rises until it reaches the maximum sustainable yield and then declines. This characteristic is 
transmitted  in modified proportions to the average cost curve of Figure 2. This latter curve, then, has a backward-bending 
segment at prices higher than the level that will bring forth a maximum output. If the assumptions of the model are realistic 
in their essential features, such a curve may be considered representative for the fishing industry. 
As  a result of this reversing slope of the supply curve, one may expect that with a steadily increasing demand for the prod- 
uct of a fishery, typically the quantity produced will first increase (Q1, Q2) and eventually decrease (Q2, Q3), while the price 
will continue to rise (PI, PZ,  P3). There are enough recognized instances of 'overfishing' ( . .  .  ) to intimate that for specific 
fisheries demand levels have indeed pushed operations to a point on the backward slope of the supply curve, where increased 
effort is accompanied by lower output and a higher (re2P price. 
3~ee  particularly Ralph Turvey, 'Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation', American Economic Review, Vol. 54, March 
1964, pp. 64-76. The definitions and qualifying assumptions of this article apply here insofar as they are relevant. 
4~y  changing the selectivity of fishing gear  with respect to the size of the fish caught, the effect of any level of fishing effort on the equi- 
librium catch may be modified. Turvey's  analysis (op. cit.) applies specifically to a trawl fishery in which the selectivity of gear may be mani- 
pulated by regulated variation in  the permissible minimum mesh sizes. In the present article a fixed pattern of gear selectivity is assumed (not 
necessarily confined to trawling gear) in conformity with the postulation of a fixed technology. The yield curve in the S.E. quadrant of Figure 1 
here corresponds with a yield curve for a fixed mesh size in Turvey's analysis.   o ow ever, intramarginal factor units will enjoy rents attributable to themselves as measured by the difference between marginal opportunity 
cost  and their own opportunity costs (cf. Tuwey, op. cit., p. 66.) 
4e  standard work  in the f*ld is R. J. H. Bemrton [sic] and S. I. Holt, On b  Dynamics ofExploited Fish PowZutions. United Kingdom, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, 1957. 





Fig.  2. Long-run fishery supply and demand curves [caption by 











Fig.  1. Relationship among fishing effort, output, and total cost 
[caption by author, not Copes]. 
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